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How Should a Court Deal with a
Primary
Question
That
the
Legislature Seeks to Avoid? The
Israeli Controversy over Who is a Jew
as an Illustration
Gidon Sapir*
ABSTRACT

Legislative avoidance of principled decisions on
substantive questions by transferringthe decision-making task
to the executive branch, is a frequent scenario. The legislature
does this by way of either express or hidden delegation, i.e., by
using ambiguous wording that on its face only requires
interpretationbut which in fact requires a substantive decision
on the matter at stake. The Israeli legislature resorted to the
hidden delegation tactic to avoid the adoption of a substantive
decision in the dispute over the question of who is a Jew-a
dispute that has divided Israeli society and World Jewry
(especially its U.S. component) since the establishment of the
state of Israel. This Article presents a complex analysis of the
Israeli Supreme Court's treatment of this hidden delegation.
The aim of the Article is to enhance the U.S. reader's
understandingof the various options available to a court while
tackling the fundamental question of the nondelegationdoctrine
and to offer a few new insights as to how this question should be
resolved.
As is well known, during the last few decades, the U.S.
Supreme Court has avoided applying the nondelegation
doctrine, even though it has never been officially overruled. One
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of the stratagems employed by the U.S. Supreme Court to avoid
applying the doctrine is the strategy of denying the existence of
delegation, in reliance on the "double test" established in
Chevron. This Article will demonstrate the similarity between
this evasion tactic and the tactics used by the majority of the
justices on the Israeli Supreme Court in the matter of who is a
Jew. It will then briefly review the arguments offered by the
doctrine's opponents and present a new, narrower version of the
doctrine, which distinguishes between express delegation and
hidden delegation and only seeks to disqualify the latter. It will
argue that this version of the doctrine-which was employed in
Israel by one minority Justice-couldeven be acceptable to those
U.S. justices and scholars who for various reasons oppose the
doctrine in its complete form.
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I. INTRODUCTION

U.S. scholars of constitutional law have long been engaged in
almost obsessive attempts to illuminate the justification for judicial
review of legislative decisions and its legitimate limits. On its face,
there is a fundamental tension between the conferral of the right of
the "last word" to the court and democracy, hence the need to justify
judicial review. 1
However, the tension between judicial activity and democracy is
not only expressed in cases in which courts interfere with the
legislature's decisions. It also emerges in cases in which the court is
required to resolve issues that the legislature intentionally avoided.
Indeed, quite frequently the legislature circumvents the resolution of

1.

See ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME

COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16-17 (1962). For a general survey see PAUL W. KAHN,
LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY: SELF GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY

(1992). To date, the vast majority of western countries function within the framework
of the constitutional model, and in that framework, the court has the right of the last
word. Even so, a number of countries have adopted intermediate models (between the
model of the legislative supremacy and the model of judicial supremacy), which confer
powers to the court in constitutional matters and simultaneously maintain a dialogue
between the judicial branch and the executive branch. This characterizes the models
(which differ from each other) that were adopted in England and Canada. For a
description of the models and their characterization as intermediate models (or another
appellation-Weak form Judicial Review), see, for example, Stephen Gardbaum, The
New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism,49 AM. J. COMP. L.. 707 (2001); Mark
Tushnet, Comparative Constitutionalism:State Action, Social Welfare Rights, and the
JudicialRole: Some Comparative Observations, 3 CHI J. INT'L L. 435, 447-53 (2002).
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substantive questions. Questions left undecided by the legislature
thus find their way to the judicial branch after having been decided
by the executive branch.
This second category of cases can be divided into two scenarios:
the express delegation to the executive branch of the power to decide
or the adoption of an ambiguous decision that fails to decide the
question at issue, intending or at least anticipating its decision by the
other branches of government. This Article is devoted to a discussion
of these two methods of avoidance, which will be referred to
respectively as "express delegation" and "hidden delegation," along
with the possible methods of response available to the court when
encountering such cases.
This Article presents four modes of response a court can choose
from when called upon to address a substantive question that the
legislature avoided deciding and that was instead decided by the
executive branch. One response is to decide the question on its merits
using substantive claims. A second method is to maintain
neutrality-in other words, to render a decision on the file but
refrain from a decision on the fundamental dispute. 2 A third method
is that of judicial restraint: absent an explicit reason based in law or
public consensus militating against the decision of the executive
branch, the court will refrain from interfering with its decision. The
fourth mode is the adoption of tactics intended to compel the
legislature, or at least to pressure it into arriving at a democratic
decision on the matter. The Article is devoted to a detailed discussion
of the advantages and disadvantages attaching to each method and
attempts to pinpoint the most appropriate method from a democratic
perspective.
The options available to the court in the current context may be
presented and discussed in the abstract, but the discussion will
benefit from concrete examples. Therefore, this Article will center on
a classic case study in Israeli Law-the legal and public dispute over
the question of who is a Jew. Israeli immigration laws grant every
Jew the right to immigrate to Israel and automatically to be granted
citizenship (the status of an oleh), but the Israeli legislature failed to
furnish a precise definition of the term "Jew" for that purpose,
despite its awareness of the controversy and the varying
interpretations that can be given to the concept "Jew." 3 The
legislature did not perform express delegation, because it did not
expressly delegate the authority to decide to the executive branch.
But, in its failure to provide an exact definition despite its awareness

2.
It might be asked: How can one decide a file without deciding the dispute?
The response, which will be presented in greater detail below, is that indeed, this is
impossible. Nonetheless, the court may well attempt to claim that it did not decide.
3.
Z. Warhaftig, Who is a Jew, 11 JEWISH L. AsS'N STUD. 23 (2000).
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of the controversy, it performed hidden delegation when it
transferred the undecided matter to the executive branch with the
knowledge and intention that it would be decided by the executive
branch. The executive branch gave the term its own interpretation
and acted accordingly. 4 A number of individuals and organizations,
aggrieved by the interpretation, petitioned the court, requesting it to
reject the interpretation of the executive branch and to adopt another
in its place. 5 The opinions given by the justices addressing the
dispute over the years, whether as majority or minority opinions,
may be classified into the four fundamental categories of response
mentioned above. The description of these four methods in their
concrete settings will assist in their evaluation and expose the
advantages and disadvantages of each one.
The Article is structured as follows: Part II will present the
dispute over who is a Jew and describe its evolution through the
decisions of the Israeli Supreme Court, focusing on five leading
opinions, the first in 1970 and the last in 2005. Part III exemplifies
the concrete expressions of the four methods for decision-making in
the majority or minority opinions given in the opinions surveyed in
Part II. Part III.A. will describe and evaluate the first method-the
substantive decision. The claim will be that this method is
problematic from a democratic perspective. Part III.B. will analyze
the second method of making decisions-the neutral decision. This
method was utilized by the majority justices in some of the decisions
surveyed in Part II, and it too is problematic. Firstly, it is doubtful
whether a truly neutral decision is even possible, for even where the
neutral presentation is made in good faith, its consequences cannot
be neutral. Furthermore, on numerous occasions the pretence of
neutrality is no more than a faqade concealing an unequivocal, valuebased decision. Part III.C. will deal with the third method, that of
judicial restraint, which is expressed by judicial respect and deferral
to the position adopted by the executive branch. It will argue that
this mode is preferable to its predecessors but that it, too, is flawed
by two weaknesses. Firstly, the decision not to intervene preserves
the status quo ante, despite its being acceptable to only one of the
parties. This means that wherever there is a dispute between an
individual and the executive authority, a decision not to intervene
will always be a decision in the authority's favor. Secondly, the
institution of a policy of nonintervention in the executive authority's
decisions may produce arbitrary results.
After describing, and rejecting, the three first operative modes,
Part III.D. will proceed with a description and evaluation of the

4.

Asher Maoz, Who is a Jew? - Much Ado About Nothing, II JEWISH L. ASS'N

STUD. 75, 77-89 (2000).

5

Id.
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fourth method. In this mode of decision-making, the court utilizes
tactics designed to compel the legislature, or at least pressure it, to
democratically decide the issue at hand. It will argue that this
method is the most commendable one from a democratic perspective.
The fourth operative method has an advantage over its three
predecessors, but it, too, has certain weaknesses. The main drawback
is a practical one: on many an occasion it seems that it is not a viable
option. The court's powers are limited; it is powerless to force the
legislature to resolve an issue that the legislature has chosen to
circumvent, and it is doubtful whether it would even be possible or
proper to confer such power. Even so, relying on a number of
examples, the Article will claim that contrary to first impressions, the
practical shortcoming is not a major one. The court holds certain
cards, and intelligent use of those cards is likely to engender a
resolution on the legislature's part.
The U.S. reader will certainly be familiar with the question
discussed in this Article. Courts and scholars in the United States
deal with similar concerns in the framework of the discourse on the
nondelegation doctrine. Part IV will attempt to clarify how the
Article's position fits into the U.S. discourse in this field. The first
section of Part IV will show how the U.S. doctrine of nondelegation is
consistent with the fourth method of response. It is well known that
during the last several decades, the U.S. Supreme Court has avoided
applying the doctrine, even though it has never been officially
overruled. One of the stratagems employed by the Court to avoid
applying the doctrine is based on its denial of the existence of
delegation, by relying on the double test established in Chevron. The
Article will highlight the similarity between this evasion tactic and
the tactics used by the justices of the Israeli Supreme Court in the
matter of who is a Jew. The second section of Part IV will attempt to
make a modest contribution to the internal U.S. discourse. It will
briefly review the arguments offered by those opposing the doctrine's
application and will attempt to present a new, narrower version of
the doctrine which distinguishes between express delegation and
hidden delegation, and only seeks to disqualify the latter. It will
argue that this version of the doctrine can, and should, be acceptable
even to those U.S. justices and scholars who for various reasons
oppose it in its complete form.
The U.S. reader stands to gain a dual benefit from this Article.
On one level, the Article presents a complex analysis of one of the
central controversies that has divided Israeli society and World
Jewry (especially its U.S. component), since the establishment of the
state of Israel and which is now about to be finally decided by the
Court. However, this Article also has a second dimension. The
discussion of the Israeli controversy will provide the U.S. reader with
a better understanding of the fundamental question of nondelegation
and with a few new insights as to how this question may be resolved.
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II. BACKGROUND

A. Introduction
Enacted in 1950,6 the Law of Return grants every Jew the right8
7
to immigrate to Israel, and in conjunction with the Citizenship Law,
which allows every oleh (immigrant under the Law of Return) to
receive citizenship, it enables every Jew to become a citizen of the
state, almost automatically. 9 The Population Registry Law, 10
(Registry Law) establishes a duty to register certain particulars of
every citizen in the state, among them, national affiliation and
religion. Since the passing of the Law of Return and the Registry Law
until today, there has been an ongoing dispute over the question of
who is a Jew for the purposes of these laws. On more than one
occasion, the Israeli Supreme Court has been required to adjudicate
the resolution of these disputes, and the question has yet to merit a
complete and definitive answcr.
The history of the controversy can be divided into two periods:
pre-1970 and thereafter. Until 1970, neither the Law of Return nor
the Registry Law carried any definition of the term "Jew," thus
leaving room for a broad spectrum of possible interpretations. 1 In
1970, both of the laws were amended. 12 In the framework of the
amendment, the Law of Return defined "Jew" as one who was born to
a Jewish mother or who had converted, and the Registry Law refers
to the provision in the Law of Return. 13 From this point onwards, the
question was no longer "who is Jew"; it became instead "who is a
convert" because the legislature failed to determine the nature of the
conversion that was necessary to satisfy the requirements of the

6.
Law of Return, 5710-1950, 4 LSI 114 (1949-50) (Isr.).
7.
Israel's first Prime Minister, David Ben-Gurion, stated the following during
a speech introducing the Law of Return to the Knesset: "This is not a Jewish state
It is a state for Jews
merely because Jews are the majority of its population.
embodies the central purpose of our state."
The Law of Return ...
everywhere ....
YORAM HAZONY, THE JEWISH STATE: THE STRUGGLE FOR ISRAEL'S SOUL 56 (2000) (citing

David Ben-Gurion, Prime Minister, Speech (July 3, 1950), reprinted in JERUSALEM
POST, July 19, 1957).
8.
Nationality Law, 5712-1952, 6 LSI 50 (1951-52) (Isr.).
9.
While the Law of Return establishes the right of every Jew to immigrate to
Israel (the "right of return"), another legislative act, the Citizenship Law, provides
three other ways by which to acquire Israeli citizenship: residence, birth, and
naturalization. Citizenship Law, 5712-1952, 6 LSI 50 (1951-52) (Isr.).
Population Registry Law, 5725-1965, 19 LSI 288 (1964-65) (Isr.) (replacing
10.
the Registration of Inhabitants Ordinance, 5709-1949.
11.
Law of Return (Amendment No. 2), 5730-1970, 24 LSI 28 (1969-70) (Isr.).
12.
Id.
Id. ("For the purposes of this Law, 'Jew' means a person who was born to a
13.
Jewish mother or has become converted to Judaism and who is not a member of
another religion").
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Laws. 14 The absence of a statutory definition (until 1970) or a precise
definition (after 1970) was not an oversight. It reflected an attempt

on the legislature's part to evade the need to decide a substantive
question over which the Israeli public was deeply divided. 15 Of
course, the legislative inaction did not solve the problem; it just made
it someone else's problem, initially the executive branch (who was
saddled with deciding how to implement an ambiguous statute), and
thereafter the court when it was requested to intervene in the
decision of the executive branch. For purposes of this Article, a
comprehensive and exhaustive history of the protracted and intricate
debates is unnecessary. 16 The Article will instead have a focused
examination, and in the next Part it will describe five main cases in
which the Israeli Supreme Court addressed the controversy and the
chronological connection between the cases.

14.
See Pinhas Shifman, On Conversions Not in Accordance with Halakhah, 11
JEWISH L.ASS'N STUDIES, 65, 69 (2000) ("There is a school of thought that emphasizes
the fact that the Knesset rejected any definition which intended to specify that only an
Orthodox conversion is valid, but this same school ignores the fact that the Knesset
also rejected the opposite view that suggested that any conversions which 'is accepted
by one of the Jewish movements' should be recognized as valid."); Maoz, supra note 4,
at 77; see also Mark Altschul, Note, Israel's Law of Return and the Debate of Altering,
Repealing or MaintainingIts Present Language, 2002 U. ILL. L. REv. 1345, 1357 (2002).
15.
There are those who claim that the abstention from a definition during the
stages of legislation was not the product of a desire to evade the dispute but rather of
the assumption of the founders of the state that it was not necessary.
Ultimately, the legal definition is not tremendously important, for at the end of
the day, the Law of Return was not intended to resolve disputes. Its purpose
was the return of the sons to their borders, and if a person who regards himself
as Jewish wishes to immigrate to Israel, and the immigration authorities are
satisfied on the basis of reasonable evidence, that he is indeed Jewish, they will
certainly not close the country's gates on him.
MOSHE SILBERG, PERSONAL STATUS IN ISRAEL 349 (1965) (Isr.); see also Minister of
Justice Shapira, Comment, DK (1970) 56 ("The members of the Provisional Council of
State did not apparently imagine that the term 'nation' would one day become the
source of a complex legal dispute. It would appear that they did not consider the entire
complex of problems associated with intermarriage."). At all events, when the Law of
Return was amended in 1970, it was quite obvious that there was a need for a clear
definition.
The adoption of the ambiguous definition at the second stage was
undoubtedly the result of the inability to reach a full agreement. The attempt to arrive
at a clearer definition was the subject of the debate in the Knesset plenum during the
first reading, preceding the amendment of the Law. See DK (1970) 56, 723-52.
16.
Over the years, an extensive literature has developed on the subject, in
Hebrew and in English. The following is a partial list of the articles in English: Asher
Maoz, Wlho is a Convert?, 15 JUST. 11 (1997); Maoz, supra note 4, at 76; Nancy Caren
Richmond, Israel's Law of Return: Analysis of Its Evolution and PresentApplication, 12
DICK. J. INT'L L. 95 (1993); Menashe Shawa, Comments on the Law of Return
(Amendment No, 2): Who is a Jew, 3 U. OF TEL Aviv L. STUD. 143 (1997).
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The Shalit 1 7 case was the first and most prominent of the cases
in terms of its public profile, the political and legislative responses it
evoked, and the breadth and depth of the proceedings devoted to its
resolution by the justices of the Israeli Supreme Court. It belongs to
the first period, preceding 1970, and it was the supreme court's
decision in Shalit that triggered the amendment of the Law of Return
20
19
18
The other four cases-Pessaro, Na'amat,
and the Registry Law.
22
21
Toshbeim 1, and Toshbeim 11 -belong to the second period, during
which the dispute was confined to determining who was a convert.
B. The Shalit Case
Benjamin Shalit was an officer in the Israeli Navy. 2 3 While
studying in Edinburgh, he married Anne, a non-Jewish, Scottish
woman. 24 In 1960, Anne joined her husband in Israel and received a
resident certificate. 25 In her registration documents, she declared
herself a British national with no religion. 26 In 1964, a son was born
to the couple, and in 1967, their daughter was born. 27 Shalit
attempted to register his children in accordance with the Registry
Law, in the rubric for religion as having no religion, and in the rubric
of national affiliation as Jews. 28 However, the registration clerk
refused his request regarding the national affiliation rubric. 29 Shalit
petitioned the Israeli Supreme Court. 30 He claimed that a distinction

17.

HCJ 58/68 Shalit v. Minister of the Interior [1970] IsrSC 23(2) 477,

translated in

SELECTED JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL, SPECIAL

VOLUME 35 (Asher Felix Landau ed., 1971) [hereinafter SELECTED JUDGMENTS].
18.
See id.
HCJ 1031/93 Alian Pessaro v. Minister of the Interior [1995] IsrSC 49(4) 49,
19.
abridged in 15 JUSTICE 43-48 (Dec. 1997).

20.

HCJ 5070/95 Na'amat v. Minister of the Interior [20021 IsrSC 56(2) 721,

abridged in 31 JUSTICE 37-42 (Mar. 2002).

HCJ 2597/99 Toshbeim v. Minister of the Interior [2004] IsrSC 58(5) 412
21.
[hereinafter Toshbeim I].
HCJ 2597/99 Toshbeim v. Minister of the Interior [2005] (unpublished)
22.
[hereinafter Toshbeim II].
23.
24.
25.

SELECTED JUDGMENTS, supra note 17, at 62-63.
Id. at 62.
Id.

26.
27.

Id. at 103.
Id. at 63.

28.
29.

Id.
Id.

Parallel to its function as an appellate court (criminal and civil, both by
30.
right and with leave), Section 15 of the Basic Law: Judicature grants the Israeli
Supreme Court discretionary power, as a first (and final) instance to hear petitions
against the various government agencies. In these cases the Israeli Supreme Court
presides in the capacity of the High Court of Justice. The decisions dealt with in this
Article belong to this category. For a description and evaluation of the work of the
Supreme Court sitting as the High Court of Justice, see Yoav Dotan, Judicial Review
and PoliticalAccountability: the Case of the High Court of Justice in Israel, 32 ISR. L.
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should be made between the questions of religion and of nationality
and that a person could belong to the Jewish nation without
necessarily being a member of the Jewish religion. 31 In his view, the
proper criterion for assessing whether a person belongs to the Jewish
nation was the criterion of identification with the Israeli-Jewish
culture and values, and in his view, his children satisfied that
criterion. 32 According to Shalit, the test should comprise both
subjective and objective components: subjective in accordance with
the subjective feelings and perceptions of the applicant, and objective
in accordance with the applicant's objective connection to the Jewish
33
national group.
In an unprecedented panel of nine justices, 34 the supreme court
unanimously called upon the legislature to delete the national
affiliation rubric from the Population Registry, thus obviating the
need to decide the question, which as stated by then-President
Agranat, was "one that does not admit of a judicial solution but lies
entirely in the ideological sphere."3 5 The legislature refrained from

REV. 448 (1998); David Kretzmer, Democracy in the Jurisprudence of the Supreme
Court of Israel, 26 ISR.Y.B. HUM. RTS. 267 (1996); Meir Shamgar, Judicial Review of
Knesset Decisions by the High Court of Justice, 28 ISR. L. REV. 43 (1994).
31.
SELECTED JUDGMENTS, supra note 17, at 150.
32.
Id.
33.
Id. at 79.
34.
Currently, fifteen justices serve in the Israeli Supreme Court. Unlike the
U.S. Supreme Court, where the entire bench presides over all cases, the Israeli
Supreme Court usually sits as a bench of three. However, there is a possibility of
expanding the panel. See Courts Law, 5744-1984, 34 LSI 278 (1983-84) (Isr.). The
difference between the Israeli and the U.S. Courts with respect to the initial, or default,
size of the bench can be explained inter alia as a result of the fact that in the United
States, the Supreme Court's exercise of its jurisdiction is primarily discretionary. See
Judges Bill of 1925, 43 Stat. 936 (1925) (abrogating almost all proceedings subject to
the obligatory jurisdiction of the Supreme Court). For discussion, see RICHARD A.
POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM 4-5 (1996). During the last
few years the U.S. Supreme Court has made extensive use of its screening power and
hears no more than 100 cases a year. See id. at 80-81; David M. O'Brien, The
Rehnquist Court's Shrinking Plenary Docket, 81 JUDICATURE 58 (1997). In Israel on
the other hand, the supreme court presides as a court for appeals by right in civil and
criminal matters and as a first instance in most public matters. See Dotan, supra note
30, at 450. As a result, its caseload is unparalleled by any of the supreme courts in
other countries. In view of the immense caseload, a hearing before a full bench or even
an expanded panel is almost impossible. Despite this, in the years 1948-1990, there
were a number of occasions in which the Israeli Supreme Court presided as an
expanded panel. In most of the cases it sufficed with five justices. Id. There were only
two cases in which the court sat as a panel larger than five justices. Once, it sat as a
panel of seven (HCJ 51/80 Cohen v. Rabbinical High Court of Appeals (1980) IsrSC
35(2) 8), and on one occasion only, in Shalit, it sat as a panel of nine. In this context it
bears mention that President Agranat attended law school at the University of
Chicago. Pnina Lahav argues that when President Agranat chose the Court to sit as a
panel of nine in deciding the Shalit case, he demonstrated a "striking reminder of his
attachment to his native culture." PNINA LAHAV, JUDGMENT IN JERUSALEM: CHIEF
JUSTICE SIMON AGRANAT AND THE ZIONIST CENTURY 200 (1997).

35.

SELECTED JUDGMENTS, supra note 17, at 149.
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assenting to the request, and thus the court had no choice but to rule
on the matter, and by a majority of five against four, it decided to
grant the petition and instructed that the children be registered as
belonging to the Jewish nation. 36
The court's decision triggered a public storm and a threat on the
National Religious Party's part 37 to bolt the coalition, a move that
would have precipitated the government's downfall. 38 The resulting
pressures culminated in an amendment of the Law of Return and the
Registry Law, and a new section was enacted, which for purposes of
these particular laws defined a Jew as a person born to a Jewish
39
mother or who had converted and did not belong to another religion.
From that time onwards, the question ceased to be "who is a Jew"
and became "who is a convert" because the legislature failed to state
which "conversion" was necessary to comply with the statutory
40
requirements.
C. The Pessaro Case
Eliana Pessaro, a Christian born in Brazil, arrived in Israel as a

42
tourist. 4 1 In Israel, she met and married a Jew named Goldstein.

Before her marriage, Pessaro underwent a conversion ceremony in
the Beit Din (Rabbinical Court) of the Council of Progressive Rabbis
in Israel. 43 She then applied for an immigration certificate (teudat

For a discussion of the judgment and the related circumstances, see LAHAV,
36.
supra note 34, at 196-200; Altschul, supra note 14, at 1353-56; Noah Baer, Who is a
Jew? A Determination of Ethnic Status for Purposes of the Israeli Population
Registery,1O COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 133 (1971); Lawrence S. Nesis, Who is a Jew?, 4
MANITOBA L. J. 53 (1970).

37.
The National Religious Party (N.R.P.) is regarded as the representative of
the modern Orthodox stream in Israel. Regarding the N.R.P., see GARY SCHIFF,
TRADITION AND POLITICS; THE RELIGIOUS PARTIES OF ISRAEL (1977).

38.
Regarding the N.R.P.'s threats to quit the coalition if the registration not
being amended by way of legislation, see N.R.P. Walkout Threat, JERUSALEM POST, Jan.
25, 1970.

39.
Following the amendment of the Law of Return, the Court rejected an
additional petition filed by Shalit in which he requested to have his third child, who
was born after the decision in the first petition, registered as a Jew. HCJ 18/72 Shalit
v. Minister of the Interior [1972] IsrSC 23(1) 334, 336.
40.
Notably, together with the restriction of the right of return within the
framework of the new definition of "Jew," the Knesset added another section to the Law
of Return, which greatly expanded the right of return by granting it to any family
member of an entitled person (i.e., a Jew by the above-mentioned definition), up to a
third generation and regardless of the family members' religious affiliation. Section 4A
of the 1970 Amendment vests in "a child and a grandchild of a Jew, the spouse of a
Jew, the spouse of a child and a grandchild of a Jew" all the rights of an oleh to Israel.
Law of Return (Amendment No. 2), 5730-1970, 24 LSI 28 (1969-70) (Isr.).
41.
HCJ 1031/93 Alian Pessaro v. Minister of the Interior [1995] IsrSC 49(4)
49, 661, abridged in 15 JUSTICE 43-48 (Dec. 1997).
Id. at 699.
42.
Id. at 672.
43.
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oleh) and to be registered as a Jewess. 44 Her application was refused,
and she petitioned the supreme court. 45 There was already explicit
supreme court precedent in a previous petition (the Shas case), which
supported Ms. Pessaro. In Shas, the court adjudicated the question of
46
the standing of Reform conversion for purposes of the Registry Law.
The court ruled that "a declaration supported by a document that is
proof that a conversion has taken place in a Jewish community
abroad, is sufficient to compel the authorities to register that person
as Jewish. It makes no difference whether that community was
Orthodox, Conservative, or Reform. '' 47 However, the Minister of the
Interior attempted to distinguish the petitioner's case from the issue
adjudicated in the previous case, claiming that the previous ruling
was confined to conversions conducted abroad. 48 Conversions in
Israel, on the other hand, are regulated by the provisions of the
Religious Community (Change) Ordinance, which makes the validity
of the conversion contingent upon the certification of the Chief
Rabbi. 49 The court rejected this argument by a majority of six against
one, explaining that the Change Ordinance was not relevant for
50
purposes of the Registry Law.
In view of this holding, the result ought to have been the
granting of the petitioner's application, in other words ordering that
she be registered as Jewish and granting her an oleh certificate.
However, the court avoided this path. In the words of Supreme Court
President, Aharon Barak:
Our decision today is of a limited scope. We have only ruled that the
Religious Community (Change) Ordinance is not applicable in the
context of recognition of conversion for purposes of the Law of Return
and the Population Registry Law .... Hence we have not ordered the
respondents to recognize the petitioner as Jewish under the Law of
Return, and we have not instructed that she be registered as Jewish in
51
the Registry.

44.
Id. at 699.
45.
Id.
46.
HCJ 264/87 Shas Movement v. Minister of the Interior [1989] IsrSC 43(2)
723, abridged in 11 JEWISH LAW ASSOCIATION STUDIES 133 (2000).
47.
JEWISH LAW ASSOCIATION STUDIES, supra note 46, at 134. For a discussion
of the decision, see Ayelet Shachar,, Whose Republic?: Citizenship and Membership in
the Israeli Polity, 13 GEO. IMMIGR. L. J. 233, 246-47 (1999).
48.
Pessaro,IsrSC 49(4) at 678, abridged in 15 JUSTICE 43-48 (Dec. 1997).
49.
Religious Community (Change) Ordinance, The Laws of Palestine, Vol. 2,
1294 (1933) ("A person who has changed his religion and wishes his conversion to be
legally validated will receive from the head of the religious community which he has
joined ... a certificate that proves that the person has been accepted into that religious
community.").
50.
Pessaro,IsrSC 49(4) at 746, abridged in 15 JUSTICE 43-48 (Dec. 1997).
51.
See HCJ 1031/93 Alian Pessaro v. Minister of the Interior [1995] IsrSC
49(4) 49, 661, 747, abridged in 15 JUSTICE 43-48 (Dec. 1997) (translated by author).
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The court's ruling is puzzling. Ms. Pessaro applied to the Ministry of
the Interior, requesting its recognition of her conversion, and the
Ministry refused her application, arguing that the conversion did not
comply with the provisions of the Change Ordinance. 52 Having
rejected the arguments of the Ministry, the court ought to have
allowed her request by granting the remedy she requested. Indeed, in
clarifying the reasons for its surprising decision, the court declared
that its abstention from an operative ruling actually stemmed from
its desire to give the legislature the opportunity to establish the
proper standard for the recognition of conversions for purposes of the
Law of Return. A number of commentators regarded this argument
53
as a rare manifestation of judicial restraint on the court's part.
Even so, the court stressed that its abstention from a decision was
temporary and contingent upon the matter being definitively resolved
by the legislature. 54 According to President Barak,
We are not ruling on "what is" (the substantive content of the
conversions in Israel). As we noted, "what is" may be determined in
detail and explicitly by the legislature. However, as long as the
legislature has not done so, it cannot be said that there is a lacuna. A
solution to the problem of "what is" lies in the Law of Return, which
defines who is a Jew. Should the legislature refrain from adding to the
law, there will no escaping a judicial resolution based on the existing
55
definition.

In the wake of the judgment and under the pressure of the court's
ultimatum, a public committee, the Neeman Committee, was
56
appointed to discuss the matter and formulate recommendations.
The Committee consisted of representatives from the Orthodox
stream as well as representatives of the "liberal" streams, the
Conservative and Reform. 57 The Committee reached a compromise
formula, which proposed the establishment of an institution
designated for the preparation for conversion and the conversion

52.
Id. at 679.
53.
See, e.g., Maoz, Who is a Convert?, supra note 16, at 15. Over the last few
decades the Israeli Supreme Court has been characterized by its judicial activism,
expressed inter alia by its willingness to establish substantive policy without leaving it
to the other branches of government. For such interpretation of judicial activism, see,
for example, Bradley C. Canon, A Framework for the Analysis of JudicialActivism, in
SUPREME COURT ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT 385 (S. C. Halperin & C. W. Lamb eds.,

1982).

For discussion of judicial activism in its Israeli context, see Aharon

Barak,

Foreword:A Judge on Judging: the Role of a Supreme Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV.

L. REV. 16 (2002); Shimon Shetreet, Resolving the Controversy over the Form and
Legitimacy of ConstitutionalAdjudication in Israel: A Blueprintfor Redefining the Role
of the Supreme Court and the Knesset, 77 TUL. L. REV 659 (2003).
54.
Pessaro,IsrSC 49(4) at 747-48, abridged in 15 JUSTICE 43-48 (Dec. 1997).

55.
56.
for the full
57.

Id. (translated by author).
See MICHAEL KORINALDI, THE ENIGMA OF JEWISH IDENTITY 203 (2001) (Isr.)

Committee Report.
See id.
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itself. According to the proposal, the three streams would all .be
involved in the preparatory process, but only Orthodox Rabbis would
conduct the conversion ceremony itself. 58 Towards the end of the
deliberations, the representatives of the liberal streams conditioned
their consent to sign the Committee's conclusions on a public
declaration of support for the Committee's conclusions by the Chief
Rabbis. The Rabbis refused to make such a declaration, and in
response, the representatives of the liberal streams refused to sign
onto the Committee's conclusions. 59 Under these circumstances, the
political elements that orchestrated the attempts at dialogue and
compromise found it difficult to muster the Knesset majority required
to anchor the recommendations of the Neeman Committee in
legislation. Members of the liberal movements no longer regarded
themselves as being bound to the mediation procedure outside the
courtroom, and hence they resumed their attempts at attaining their
goals through legal channels.
D. The Na'amat Case
The Na'amat case was a partial continuation of the discontinued
adjudication in the Pessaro case. This time the court panel consisted
of eleven justices, and five files were considered. Two of them
concerned applications for recognition as a Jew, both for purposes of
the Law of Return and for purposes of the Registry Law; the other
three dealt exclusively with recognition for purposes of the Registry
Law. 60 Following repeated deferrals, the court decided to split the
adjudication into two stages: first, it would decide the three files
concerning merely the Registry, and only at the second stage would it
consider the two files which involved the question of who is a Jew for
purposes of the Law of Return. The first three files concerned
conversions conducted in Israel by Rabbis from the Conservative or
the Reform movement or conversions conducted abroad, where the
candidates for conversion were not members of the communities in
which the conversion took place. Regarding the conversions
conducted in Israel, the State reiterated its position in Pessaro (even
though this position had already been rejected), to the effect that the
certification of the Chief Rabbis was a condition for the validity of the
conversion. 61 Regarding the conversions conducted abroad, the State
attempted to distinguish these conversions and the conversions that

58.

See id.; see also Herb Keinon, The Panel's Recommendations, JERUSALEM

POST, Jan. 25, 1998, at 1.

59.
See Haim Shapiro, Rabbinical Council Spurns Compromise with NonOrthodox, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 10, 1998, at 1.
60.
HCJ 5070/95 Na'amat v. Minister of the Interior [2002] IsrSC 56(2) 721,
729-31, abridged in 31 JUSTICE 37-42 (Mar. 2002).
61.
Id. at 731.
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formed the basis of the Shas ruling. The Shas ruling, it argued,
applied exclusively to conversions conducted abroad in which the
candidate for conversion had joined the community performing the
conversion. As such, it was not applicable to residents of Israel who
had traveled abroad and undergone the conversion procedure without
any desire to join the Jewish community that conducted the
conversion. By a majority of ten against one, the court rejected the
62
State's claim and ordered that the petitioners be registered as Jews.
As mentioned, the court confined its decision to the Registry Law and
left the question of who is a Jew for purposes of the Law of Return to
a future decision.
E. The Toshbeim I Case
The Toshbeim I case was the next stage of an ongoing saga, but
it was not the final station. The court was called upon to address the
two files that had been left undecided in Na'amat. In these cases, the
question of who is a convert arose not only for purposes of the
Registration Law, but also for purposes of the Law of Return. The
moment of truth-for the deciding of the most significant questionwas approaching.
On its face, the controversy focused on the question of the status
of Conservative and Reform conversions for purposes of the Law of
Return. Nonetheless, before the hearings on the two petitions, the
attorney for the State presented a new fundamental position, which
attempted to deflect the focus of the hearing away from the question
of the validity of non-Orthodox conversions and to premise it on
altogether different grounds. The petitioners had undergone
63
conversion proceedings after having resided in Israel as non-Jews.
The State claimed that their prior residence in Israel precluded their
entitlement to the standing of an oleh under the Law of Return,
irrespective of the validity of the conversion. 64 The argument was
that the Law of Return only applied to Jews living abroad who
desired to immigrate to Israel or to Jews who came to Israel and were
resident therein as Jews; it did not apply to any person who came to
Israel and while living there underwent a conversion ceremony
(either inside or outside of Israel). 65 The essence of the Law of Return
was for the restoration of exiles and the sons returning to their
country; it was not an immigration law designed to regulate the
status of non-Jews residing in Israel. The attorney for the State
further pointed out that Israel had become a significant target for

62.
63.
64.
65.

Id.
Toshbeim I, supra note 21, at 417.
Id. at 424.
Id.
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non-Jewish immigration. 66 Based on this, he claimed that
nationalization based on conversion of persons who had arrived in
Israel as non-Jews would lead to the inundation of the state with
migrants whose sole intention was to obtain Israeli citizenship.67
This intention was entirely extraneous to the purpose of the Law of
Return and inimical to the public interest and public order. According
to the logic of the State's position, the nature of the conversion was
irrelevant, and indeed, the attorney for the State conceded that were
her position to be accepted, the Law of Return would not even apply
68
to an Orthodox conversion if conducted in Israel.
In a majority of seven against four, the court refused to accept
the State's position. The majority opinion was written by President
Barak, who explained that:
Aliya- [immigration; Literally, coming up (to Israel)], means the settling
of a Jew in Israel. For that purpose the question of when the person
who settled, actually became Jewish-before or after settling in Israelis irrelevant. It would be illegal discrimination if one person were to be
recognized as an "oleh" because he converted and subsequently settled
in Israel while the same recognition is denied to another person
desiring to settle in Israel, purely because he converted after having
come to settle in Israel. Both of the converts joined the Jewish people
and came to settle in Israel; both of them are sons returning to their
homeland. The difference between the two conversions in terms of the
"time sequence" of conversion and immigration is not germane to the
goal of the Law of Return, and the Law of Return cannot be interpreted
in a manner that leads to this type of illegal discrimination. 69

Having rejected the State's argument for negating the petitioner's
entitlement to an oleh certificate under the Law of Return, it should
have been clear sailing for the court to hand down a substantive
ruling. However, once again, as in Pessaro, the Court avoided
deciding and again turned to the state, requesting it to formulate a
substantive position regarding the nature of the conversion that was
required as a condition for a person to become Jewish, to entitle him
to the status of oleh under the Law of Return. The larger question
was left pending, though the time of decision was drawing closer.
F. The Toshbeim II Case
In the four cases surveyed so far, the court gave a substantial
decision in two of them, and in the other two it rejected the State's
pleadings without delivering a final decision on the petition.
Moreover, even in the two cases in which the court gave a principled
decision, it confined the scope of its decision to the question of who is

66.
67.

Id.
Id.

68.
69.

Id. at 426.
Id. at 428 (translated by author).
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a Jew or who is a convert for purposes of the Population Registry.
The question of the Registry is not peripheral, but there can be no
doubt that who is a Jew or a convert for the purposes of the Law of
Return is a much more important question. Yet, it was in this second
matter that the court consistently refused to rule. Toshbeim II, is the
first time the court gave its decision on the question of who is a
convert for the purposes of the Law of Return. Surprisingly, its task
was relatively easy. Before the hearing, the State presented the
following position:
The State of Israel confers equal recognition to all conversions
conducted abroad by a recognized stream of Judaism (Orthodox,
Conservative, Reform), provided that it [the conversion] was conducted
within the framework of a recognized Jewish community abroad, by the
competent organs of that community. This recognition is based on the
principle of respecting an act of a recognized Jewish community abroad.
70

Even so, the State attempted to qualify this recognition in two ways.
First, a conversion conducted abroad would only be recognized if the
convert actually joined the community in which he converted as a
means of ensuring that the conversion was genuine. 7 1 Second, the
pluralistic approach was only applicable abroad. 72 In Israel, on the
other hand, conversions would only be recognized if conducted in the
framework of and under the supervision of the national institution
established in accordance with the format proposed by the Neeman
73
Committee.
In contrast with the previous occasions where the court rejected
the State's position, this time the court was quick to endorse the
74
State's position, which conformed to the position of the petitioners.
One of the justices declared that this position was also consonant
with the legislative history. 75 Another judge stated that it was a
''conception that recognized doctrinal and value-based pluralism,
being commensurate with the fundamental constitutional conceptions
of man's freedom of religion and spirit. ' 76 Still, the court rejected the
State's qualifications by a majority of seven against four. While
acknowledging the importance of ensuring that the conversion was
genuine in view of its far-reaching legal ramifications, the majority
justices nonetheless held that to assure the seriousness of the
conversion, it was not necessary to compel the convert to join the
converting community. It is sufficient

70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.

Toshbeim II, supra note 22, at 10 (translated by author).
Id. at 12.
Id. at 19.
Id.
Id. at 13.
Id. at 10-11.
Id. at 28 (translated by author).
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that the conversion took place in a recognized Jewish community
abroad, was followed by the aliyah to Israel, and was conducted
according to the guidelines accepted in that community for someone
desiring to join the community. For that purpose it is sufficient if those
responsible on behalf of that community give notice that the person was
converted in a recognized Jewish community according to the regular
standards accepted therein, which are applied to all cases of conversion
in that community, both for those wishing to join the community and
77
for those who do not wish to join it.

Regarding the second qualification proposed by the State, pertaining
to conversions conducted in Israel, the court refused to rule on the
matter, claiming that it was not necessary, in so far as all of the
conversions dealt with in the petition were conducted abroad. 78 Even
so, from various dicta of the Court President, one can infer with a
high degree of certainty that this facet of the struggle over who is a
convert is also about to be resolved in favor of the liberal streams.

III. FOUR METHODS OF DECISION-MAKING

As stated, the purpose of this Article is not to deal on a
substantive level with the dispute over who is a Jew for purposes of
the Law of Return, nor to support any of the suggested approaches or
to suggest a new position. 7 9 Rather, this Article will focus on the
question of the court's proper role and function in its resolution of
this particular dispute as an illustration of the more general scenario
in which the political system fails to decide a primary question and
instead passes it on to the executive domain. The following Part will
analyze the principled positions taken by the various justices who
presided over the cases just described. The analysis will consist of an
initial presentation of the various positions, followed by an
evaluation of the advantages and shortcomings of each position.
Scores of justices have addressed this issue over the years, but
they can be classified into four categories, each defined by a

77.
Id. at 16 (translated by author).
78.
Id. at 19.
79.
For the variety of opinions on the issue, see, for example, ELIEZER BEN
RAFAEL, THE MEANING OF JEWISHNESS: FIFTY SCHOLARS REPLY TO BEN-GURIOIN (2001)
(Isr.). This book comprises the replies sent by about fifty Jewish scholars to BenGurion in answer to the question he sent to them. For the background to Ben-Gurion's
question to the scholars, see BARUCH LITVIN & SIDNEY HOENIG, JEWISH IDENTITY:
MODERN RESPONSA AND OPINIONS ON THE REGISTRATION OF CHILDREN OF MIXED
MARRIAGE (1965). Another substantive issue, which shall not be addressed here, is the
legitimacy in principle of an immigration policy that gives preference to Jews,
irrespective of their definition, over others. For a discussion of this subject, see CHAIM
GANS, THE LIMITATIONS OF NATIONALITY 124-28, 141-44 (2003); Ruth Gavison, The
Jews' Right To Statehood: A Defense, 15 AZURE 70 (2003); Asa Kasher, Justice and

Affirmative Action: Naturalization and Law of Return, 15 ISR. Y.B. HuM. RTS. 101
(1985); Shachar, supra note 47.
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particular institutional conception. One group of justices attempted
to resolve the question according to the best of its understanding. The
second group characterized its decision as being neutral. The third
group avoided intervening in the interpretation given by the
executive branch (not because it agreed with its interpretation, but
because it did not regard itself as entitled to intervene), and the
fourth group espoused an approach intended to ensure that the
matter would be returned to the legislature for a decision. Of these
four approaches, this Article argues that the forth is the most
appropriate.
A. Substantive-IdeologicalDecision
The first method is the decision on the question itself, involving
an inquiry into the most appropriate interpretation of the term "Jew."
The justices espousing this approach stressed the question's
ideological aspect. Accordingly, they were not content with a narrow
interpretative analysis and examined the question from various
broad perspectives: scientific, historical, sociological, psychological,
national, religious, and Zionist. In their consideration of the
substantive question, the justices generally presented it as turning on
a fundamental dichotomy between the subjective approach, that the
definition of nationality should be determined in accordance with a
person's own wishes, and the approach based on an objective
definition.8 0 The objective definition does not necessarily dictate the
endorsement of the halakhic criterion (those set forth in Jewish law),
but most of the justices who supported the objective approach
81
ultimately chose the Orthodox criterion.
A clarification is required. A review of the decisions of all the
justices who presided over the various cases indicates that a
significant number of the decisions included a substantive-ideological
examination of the question of who is a Jew,8 2 but the justices that
actually
based their
decisions
on
substantive-ideological
considerations constitute a far more restricted group. In the final
analysis, most of the justices avoided premising their decision on a
substantive analysis of the question of who is a Jew, and at all
events, they endeavored to avoid creating that impression. This Part
focuses exclusively on members of the limited group of justices who
not only considered the substantive aspect but also relied upon it in

80.
See, e.g., HCJ 265/87 Gary Lee Beresford v. Minister for the Interior [19891
IsrSC 43(3) 793 (discussing whether "Jew" should be defined subjectively or
objectively).
81.
Shifman, supra note 14.
82.
See especially Justice Berenzon's opinion in SELECTED JUDGMENTS, supra
note 17, at 185-91.
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their decision, for it is only these justices who can be regarded as
83
having utilized the first method of decision-making.
From among the members of this group, this Article concentrates
on the opinion of Justice Silberg in the Shalit case. The choice of
Justice Silberg as the representative of the first group stems from
three considerations. First, chronologically, Justice Silberg was the
first member of the group.8 4 Second, of all the members of this group,
Justice Silberg was the most extreme. While the other members of
the group also discussed the who is a Jew question on its merits, they
combined it with other lines of argument, such as statutory wording,
legislative history, government policy, etc. Justice Silberg was the
only member of this group willing to rely on substantive arguments
only. Finally, from among the members of the group Justice Silberg
displayed the broadest and deepest awareness of price and the
implications of the path he chose as well as of the other stratagems
that were available to him but which he rejected.
Justice Silberg prefaced his judgment by emphasizing the
magnitude of the question confronting the court and stressing its
ideological components:
The question which we have to consider here surpasses in import and
significance anything this court has dealt with since it first became an
Israeli court. Although in the instant case the question is a personal
one, inconsiderable and limited in scope, our examination thereof and
its ideological constituents call for the most profound and penetrating
self-scrutiny of our existence as a people, our essence as a nation and
85
our Zionist-political task in the renaissance of this country.

83.
This limited group consist of Justices Silberg and Kister in their opinions in
Shalit, in SELECTED JUDGMENTS, supra note 17, at 185-91, 102-48; Justice Tal in HCJ
1031/93 Alian Pessaro v. Minister of the Interior [19951 IsrSC 49(4) 49, 699-744,
abridged in 15 JUSTICE 43-48 (Dec. 1997), and Justice England in HCJ 5070/95
Na'amat v. Minister of the Interior [2002] IsrSC 56(2) 721, 755-59, abridged in 31
JUSTICE 37-42 (Mar. 2002).
84.
Actually, the first time that Justice Silberg entered the fray was in a
previous case, HCJ 72/62 Rufeisen v.Minister of the Interior [1962] IsrSC 16(4) 2428,
translated in SELECTED JUDGMENTS, supra note 17, at 1, also known as the "Brother
Daniel" case. The case concerned Oswald Rufeisen, a Polish Jew who had converted to
Christianity at the beginning of the Second World War. Id. Rufeisen requested to be
registered as a Jew and to receive Israeli citizenship under the Law of Return. Id. In
his judgment, Justice Silberg conducted a comprehensive analysis of the question of
who is a Jew and concluded that a person who had voluntarily converted to
Christianity could not be viewed as a Jew for the purpose of the Law of Return. Id.
For a review of the judgment, see Ralph Slovenko, "BrotherDaniel and Jewish Identity,
9 ST. LOUIS U. L. 1 (1964). For a critical analysis of Justice Silberg's position, see
Moshe Halbertal, Who is a Jew, in JEWISH CULTURE IN THE EYE OF THE STORM 233,
240-44 (Avi Sagi & Nacham Ilan eds., 2002) (Isr.).
85.
HCJ 58/68 Shalit v. Minister of the Interior [1970] IsrSC 23(2) 477,
translatedin SELECTED JUDGMENTS, supranote 17, at 48.
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Justice Silberg further pointed out that in his view the court is
not the appropriate tribunal for deciding the issue.8 6 The tribunal he
believed should resolve the question: was "the entire Jewish people,
and only a world-wide representative all-Jewish body' 87 (which does
not exist).
Still, Justice Silberg felt-the question having been
'
asked-that the court was not "at liberty to disengage [itself]. 88
Consequently, he embarked upon an examination of the question in
an attempt to ascertain "the Jewish attitude to the problem arising in
89
the present cause."
Before entering the thick of the fray, Justice Silberg made clear
that conceivably, he could have "buried" the problem beneath the
mound of formalistic procedural provisions of the Registry Law, and
indeed, the majority justices chose this path in their respective
judgments.9
However, Justice Silberg refrained from taking that
course, even though it was the easy course, holding instead that
"since our main concern in this case is not the solution of the problem
of the Shalit family,"91 but rather the "question is a weighty one for
us" and "must be answered fully. '92 The question was whether "some
test, other than the hala[k]hic test, exists for determining the
national identity of a Jew. '93 His answer, after a long discussion,
was that "[t]he search after a new test of our national identity
constitutes in fact a complete denial of the continued existence of the
Jewish People" 94 and as such must be rejected out of hand.
As stated, this Article does not engage in a substantive
discussion of the question itself, and this obviates the need for an
indepth analysis of the reasons furnished by Justice Silberg in
support of his position: that the question of who is a Jew must be
resolved in accordance with the halakhic criterion. The concern here
is solely with his use of the decision-making mode based on making a
fundamental decision guided by patently ideological considerations.
This being the case, the Article will focus on two statements
appearing at the beginning of his opinion, justifying his choice of the
principled decision. The first is that despite the court's being an
unsuitable forum for deciding the matter, it was forced to do so. The

86.
"I am not ashamed to admit that had I originally been asked, before the
petition was entered, whether the problem it encompasses might be exhaustively
treated by our court, I would most certainly have answered in the negative." SELECTED
JUDGMENTS OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL, SPECIAL VOLUME, 48 (1971).
87.
SELECTED JUDGMENTS, supra note 17, at 49.

88.
Id.
89.
Id.
90.
This is the second of the four decision-making methods, which has been
termed "the neutral decision."
91.
Id.
92.
Id.
93.
Id.
94.
Id. at 62.
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second is that despite the option of circumventing a principled
adjudication of the matter, he chose not to evade the issue, but rather
to "take the bull by its horns." There is an internal tension between
these two claims, in so far as the second one contradicts the first.
At the beginning of his opinion, Justice Silberg averred that it
would have been preferable had the court not addressed the issue,
given that it lacked the moral authority to decide a question of this
nature. 95 Justice Silberg therefore explained that his only reason for
adjudicating the matter was that in his capacity as a justice he was
unable to ignore a request that had been filed. However, if this were
the case, it is unclear why Justice Silberg failed to take the middle
path of deciding the case without addressing the fundamental issue,
if indeed he had that option, as he himself claimed. Conceivably, as
he asserted, the question of who is a Jew is indeed "a weighty one for
us" and perhaps "it must be answered fully." 96 Nevertheless, if
Justice Silberg felt that the Court was not the appropriate body to
furnish a substantive solution to the question, then the intensity and
urgency of that question cannot justify a choice on his part to deal
with the question on its merits, when he had the option of
circumventing a substantive decision. If Justice Silberg failed to take
the path of "deciding without deciding," then presumably it was
because he did not really regard himself as ill equipped to render a
decision on the issue. Justice Silberg's second claim therefore
contradicts the two foundations of his first claim, for it appears that
contrary to his first claim, Justice Silberg was not forced to resolve
the issue, but rather he chose to do so, and it further stands to reason
that he did not really think that the court was not the appropriate
body to decide the matter.
In addition to the escape route identified by Justice Silberg, he
also had at his disposal another elegant outlet which he could
similarly have chosen: the possibility of rejecting the petition out of
hand. The Shalit case was heard by the Israeli Supreme Court
presiding as the High Court of Justice, which deals primarily with
relations between the individual and government. 97 The power
conferred to the court in its capacity as the High Court is broad in
scope, but the court has the option to exempt itself from its duty to
exercise that power. 98 One of the doctrines that Justice Silberg could
have used to reject the petition out of hand is the doctrine of
injusticiability. 99 His failure to utilize this doctrine to reject the

95.
Id. at 48.
96.
Id. at 49.
97.
See Jewish Virtual Library, The Judicial Branch, http://www.jewishvirtual
library.org/jsource/Politics/judiciary.html (last visited Sept. 17, 2006).
98.
See id.
On the use of this doctrine in Israeli law, see Ariel Bendor, The
99.
Administration of Justice in the High Court of Justice, 17 MISHPATIM 592 (1988) (Isr.),
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petition further weakens his claim that the decision was forced on
him.
As illustrated, Justice Silberg's resort to the method of a
principled-ideological decision was not forced upon him, but was
rather the result of a choice. The next issue to be addressed is the
justification he gives for choosing this method. The use of the term
"justification" implies that there is something problematic in the
method of a substantive decision, for otherwise it would not require
justification. The basis for reservations regarding this method will
become clear later in this Article. For present purposes, it suffices to
indicate the accepted mentality, which perceives the judicial role as
being confined to the application of existing norms that were
democratically accepted by the governmental agencies charged with
their creation, and not to author new norms based on the justice's
own worldview. Parenthetically it must be stressed that a sharp
distinction between the creation of norms and their application is,
obviously, artificial. It is clear that any judicial decision, and
particularly one on substantive issues, cannot be entirely discretionfree and will inevitably involve a certain degree of value-based
subjectivity.10 0 However, Justice Silberg's decision in Shalit is a pure

and Ariel Bendor, Are There Any Limits to Justiciability?,7 IND. INT'L & COMP. L. REV
311 (1997). Over the last few decades, the use of this doctrine has almost completely
disappeared from Israeli Law, and it would seem that the turning point was the
judgment in HCJ 910/86 Ressler v. Minister of Defense [1988] IsrSC 42(2) 441,
translation available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/eng/verdict/ search-eng/verdict-by_
misc.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2006). During the last few years, the doctrine has been
partially revived, the process being spearheaded by Justice Yitzchak Zamir. See, e.g.,
HCJ 8666/99 Temple Mount Faithful v. Attorney Gen. [2000] IsrSC 54(1) 199 (Zamir,
J., opinion); HCJ 5167/00 Weiss v. Prime Minister [2001] IsrSC 55(2) 455 (Zamir, J.,
opinion). Justice Silberg himself addressed the issue of injusticiability in HCJ 295/65
Oppenheimer v. Ministers of the Interior and Health [1996] IsrSC 20(1) 309, 332-33
(claiming that the injusticiability doctrine is abstract and lacks a clear definition, but
still expressing willingness to resort to it in matters relating to policy (foreign policy,
internal affairs, and economics)). See Barak, supra note 53, at 97 (discussing the
threshold tests generally, and specifically regarding the injusticiability doctrine in its
Israeli context).
100.
For a while it appeared as though the question of whether a justice
presiding over a constitutional proceeding could abstain from the exercise of valuebased discretion was dependent on the dispute between competing interpretative
schools: originalism and non-originalism. One of the central arguments raised by
supporters of the originalist school was that its adoption reduces the interpretative
scope available to justices while subjecting them to objective interpretation. See, e.g.,
Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 864 (1988-1989)
("Originalism ... establishes a historical criterion that is conceptually quite separate
from the preferences of the judge himself."). However, as the academic discourse on the
subject progressed, it became increasingly apparent that even the originalist approach
cannot obviate the need for creative interpretation in the process of constitutional
decision-making. See, e.g., MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE COURTS: LAW
OR POLITICS? (1994). Perry devotes chapters four and five of his book to explaining why
"Originalism Does Not Entail Minimalism." Perry himself is one of the few who
actually changed camps over the years, from non-originalism to originalism. In the
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and unadulterated value judgment, one that prima facie exceeds the
boundaries of what is considered acceptable, even according to the
toned down description of the judicial process just presented, which
acknowledges the limited involvement of subjective-value-based
considerations in the decision-making process. The value judgment
involved in Justice Silberg's decision similarly characterizes the
manner of its presentation as well; in contrast to other cases in which
the judge can present his decision (which involves the exercise of
discretion) as reflecting the appropriate interpretation of the
language of the law or constitution, Justice Silberg himself admitted
that in this particular case, there was no legislative "hanger" to peg
the decision upon. 10 1 The question therefore is, why did Justice
Silberg chose this particular path, and not one of the other two paths
that were at his disposal: burying the inherent ideological tension
under layers of technical interpretation of the Registry Law (the
option chosen by the majority justices, which will be surveyed below
in the framework of the "neutral decision"), or rejecting the petition
out of hand on the grounds of injusticiability?
A possible answer to this question from Justice Silberg's
perspective may be inferred from the inner recesses of Justice
Silberg's own argument regarding the considerations militating
against a judicial resolution of the issue. Close examination of Justice
Silberg's comments in this context reveals that his aversion to a
judicial resolution does not stem from the conception that the court is
not an appropriate decision-making forum. From his perspective,
neither the Israeli legislature nor even the entire Israeli public by
way of a direct democratic decision is the proper forum to decide the
question of who is a Jew for purposes of the Law of Return and the
Registry Law. According to Justice Silberg the authentic respondent
to the petitioners was none other than "the Community of Israel," the
boundaries of which extended beyond those of the state, given that
this was a question of defining a collective. Paradoxically, this train
of thought may also explain Justice Silberg's readiness to decide the
dispute: if the decision should be adopted by a body that represents
the Community of Israel, and such a body is not to be found, then
importance no longer attaches to the identity of the default option. In
other words, the decision of the legislature has no primacy over the
decision of the court.

aforementioned book, he takes the originalist position, after having been a prominent
representative of the non-originalist camp for about fifteen years. For his nonoriginalist position, see MICHAEL J. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE COURTS, AND
HUMAN RIGHTS (1982); see also, Richard B. Saphire, Originalismand the Importance of
Constitutional Aspirations, 24 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599, 622-633 (1997) (discussing
possible reasons for Perry's change of position).
101.
See supra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
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If the explanation presented above lies at the basis of Justice
Silberg's choice, then conceivably he does not dispute fundamentally
the claim of illegitimacy of judicial resolutions that are premised on
ideological-value-based foundations. His readiness to have the court
enter the fray in the dispute over who is a Jew is an exception, based
on the exclusive assumption that there is no other body whose
decision would be more legitimate. However, this assumption cannot
be taken for granted. It is one thing to assert that the decision ought
to be made by a body that represents the entire Community of Israel;
it is quite another to claim that absent such a body, the legislature's
decision has no primacy over a judicial decision. Even if the
legislature is not the optimal representative of the public vested with
the right of decision, there may still be a host of reasons for choosing
the legislature over the court as a default option, both by virtue of the
fact that the legislature represents at least part of the public that is
entitled to decide the matter, and because there are weighty
considerations militating precisely against judicial intervention in an
ideological battle. Hence, the questions raised regarding Justice
Silberg's position remain unsolved.
Before proceeding to a description of the other methods utilized
by the court in the various cases, it is interesting to note the common
factor that characterizes all the justices belonging to the substantive
decision group: the members of this group belong primarily to the
Orthodox stream. This aspect may explain their decision in favor of
the halakhic criterion, but at the same time it is also somewhat
surprising. Over the last few years the court has been the target of
scathing criticism originating from different sectors of Israeli society
10 2
focused on the value-laden, ideological component of its decisions.
One of the court's most prominent and vocal detractors is the HarediOrthodox sector. 10 3 Thus, it is interesting to note that it is precisely
the "representatives" of this group who allow themselves to openly
rely on subjective, value-based considerations when deciding
controversial questions.' 0 4 As will be seen, the invoking of value-

102.
See Shahar Ilan, Relly Sa'ar & Mazal Mualem, Haredim threaten 'war' if
court keeps on 'meddling', HA'ARETZ ENG. EDITION, Feb. 15, 1999 (Isr.).
103.
A few years ago, the Ultra-Orthodox held a demonstration against the
Israeli Supreme Court, with about a quarter of a million participants. See id.
104.
During most of the years of the Israeli Supreme Court's existence,
religiously observant justices have been amongst its numbers. In his book of memoirs,
Justice Yitzckak Olshan, the second President of the Supreme Court and a member
since its establishment, severely criticized the fact that when the court was
established, the religious parties demanded that its five justices include at least one
who was religious. According to Justice Olshan, this demand was accepted without
opposition by the Provisional Government. See YITZCKAK OLSHAN, LAW AND WORDS MEMOIRS 247 (1978) (Isr.). Another justice, Haim Cohn gave an entirely different
description of the circumstances and the reasons for the appointment of a religiously
observant justice. According to Cohen, when he was serving as Attorney General he
insisted that the supreme court include one expert in Jewish Law (Mishpat Ivri) and
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based, subjective considerations is by no means the exclusive legacy
of religious justices, and a large number of the secular justices invoke
considerations of that kind. The difference is, however, that the
secular justice at least attempts to downplay the value-laden
dimension of his decision, whereas the religious judge externalizes
this dimension, some of them more and others less. Naturally, the
question is which is the more appropriate of the two approaches: an
ideological decision that conceals its ideological underpinnings, or the
same decision with its ideological foundations publicly exposed?
Either way, the fact that the representatives of the Orthodox public,
who decry the value-based dimension of the decisions of the court's
secular justices, enlist the same kind of considerations themselves,
justifiably exposed this group to the retort, "Adorn yourself first and
then adorn others." 10 5

therefore took pains to convince Ben-Gurion and the first Minister of Justice, Pinchas
Rozen, to agree to the appointment of Rabbi Simcha Assaf to the elevated position.
HAIM H.COHN, SUPREME COURT JUDGE - TALKS WITH MIKHA'EL SHASHAR 115 (1989)
(Isr.). Rabbi Assaf had been Cohn's university professor. With Rabbi Assafs death in
1953, he was not replaced by a religious justice in the supreme court. Even so, Justice
Silberg, though he did not wear a skullcap, apparently led an Orthodox lifestyle and
was regarded (and rightfully so, as attested to by his position in Shalit) as a loyal
representative of this sector. Since then, over the last thirty-five years, the court has
always had a religious justice. Since the appointment of Justice Kister, and until
today, whenever the position of the religious justice becomes vacant, another one is
immediately appointed in his place. In another forum, the Author examined the
manner in which the supreme court justices treated matters of religion and state. The
Author attempted to show that in cases in which questions arose pertaining to the
standing of religion and the scope of the principle of religious freedom, the positions
taken by the justices tended to divide along the lines of their personal worldviews: the
religious on one hand and the secular on the other. See Gidon Sapir, Law or Politics:
Israeli Constitutional Adjudication as a Case Study, 6 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN
AFF. 169 (2001-2002). For a discussion of the phenomenon of special seats in the
American context, see BARBARA A. PERRY, A "REPRESENTATIVE" SUPREME COURT? THE
IMPACT OF RACE, RELIGION, AND GENDER ON APPOINTMENTS (1991).
105.
This is particularly apposite with regard to Justice Englard. In his rulings,
he consistently decries what he regards as the exercise of strong subjective discretion
on the part of the court. See, e.g., CA 6024/97 Fredrika Shavit v. Rishon Lezion Jewish
Burial Soc'y [1999] IsrSC 53(3) 600, translation available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/
eng/verdict/search-eng/verdict_bymisc.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2006). One is
similarly astonished when reading Justice Silberg's judgment, albeit from a different
perspective. Justice Silberg's opinion in Shalit is painted in bold and adamant colors,
abounding with vitriolic pronouncements such as "[w]hoever divorces Jewish
nationality from its religious foundations assaults at the very same moment the core of
our political claim to the land of Israel; and so to do is like committing an act of real
treason."
HCJ 58/68 Shalit v. Minister of the Interior [1970] IsrSC 23(2) 477,
translatedin SELECTED JUDGMENTS, supra note 17, at 56. It is interesting to discover
that despite the emphatic, blistering nature of his remarks here, in other judgments,
Justice Silberg actually displays an extensive understanding of the complexity of the
question and of the absence of any clear-cut answers. See Michael Alberstein, From

Ringer to Barda: A Study of Evolving Genres of Interpretation in Supreme Court
Decisions, 19 BAR ILAN L. STUD. 633 (2003) (Isr.) (discussing Justice Silberg's style).
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B. A Neutral Decision
i.

Introduction

As stated, though Justice Silberg chose to decide the question on
a value-based, ideological basis, he also mentioned another optionfor the court to decide the issue without addressing the substantive
question. This was precisely the option chosen by the majority
justices in Shalit, and in their footsteps, the majority justices in
Na'amat. These justices claimed that the cases under adjudication
could be given a local, technical solution, based on the laws of the
Population Registry, without deciding the primary, substantive
question of who is a Jew. The description of this option as neutral-as
one that refrains from a substantive decision on the question of who
is a Jew-is rather problematic, both from a consequential
perspective and from a perspective that analyzes the motivations of
the justices themselves.
From a consequential perspective, the technical-statistical
approach to the Registry is disingenuous because the Registry has
numerous ramifications, symbolic and practical. This being so, in
terms of its result, one is hard put to append the label of neutrality to
a judgment enabling a person to be registered as Jewish, when
according to the Halakhah that person is not Jewish. From the
perspective of judicial motivation, contrary to the justices' pretence of
neutrality, i.e., that they were not espousing any position regarding
the value-based dispute between the parties, some of the justices
interspersed their decisions with various indicators that more than
hinted at the substantive direction of their own personal leanings,
and which constituted the basis of their decision-the direction that
preferred the subjective definition of who is a Jew over the objective
definition based on a liberal worldview.
In the wake of the discussion of the neutralist position, this
Article will examine an additional argument alluded to by the
justices-that even if one agrees that their decision on the question of
who is a Jew is substantive and not technical, and even if one agrees
that it was premised on their liberal worldview, their decision still
merits the title of neutrality because liberalism itself is premised on
the foundations of neutrality. In other words, their decision is based
on the refusal in principle to espouse any position regarding
competing definitions of the good. This Article rejects this claim,
invoking (and somewhat refining) the standard argument against
liberalism's pretension to neutrality.
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"Registry Based" Neutrality: The Attempt to Distinguish
between the Registry Law and the Substantive Law

Over the years since Shalit, the court has consistently accepted
the position of those petitioners who desired to be registered as Jews
for purposes of the Registry Law. At the first stage, the majority
justices accepted the petition of the Shalit children to be registered as
Jewish nationals even though their mother was not Jewish and they
do not consider themselves Jewish in their religion.' 0 6 At the second
stage, following the addition of a statutory definition of a Jew
consisting of two categories (Jewish mother or conversion), a petition
was accepted to register as Jewish converts who had not undergone
an Orthodox conversion. 107 In both cases, however, the majority
justices asserted that in their decision, they were not adopting a
position on the substantive dispute surrounding the question of who
08
is a Jew, and they attempted to present their decisions as neutral.
The rationale of the argument relied upon by the majority justices
was developed in another case dealing with a dispute over another
detail in the Population Registry, namely the one relating to
"personal status."' 0 9 For an understanding of the rationale of the
majority judges in the who is a Jew line of cases, the following is a
brief description of the structure of the court's contention regarding
the registration of personal status.
In the state of Israel, religious marriages have statutory
exclusivity, and the option of civil marriage is non-existent. 110 In
Funk Shlesinger,"' Ms. Funk, a Christian resident of Israel by virtue
of a visa for permanent residency, married Mr. Shlesinger, a Jewish
112
citizen of Israel, by way of a civil ceremony conducted in Cyprus.
Equipped with her marriage certificate from Cyprus, Ms. Funk
applied for registration in the Population Registry as a married
woman. 1 13 The Ministry of the Interior refused her request, claiming
114
that civil marriage is not an available option for an Israeli citizen.
She filed a petition against the refusal in the High Court of Justice,
and the High Court accepted her petition. 115

106.
107.

Shalit, in SELECTED JUDGMENTS, supranote 17, at 63.
HCJ 264/87 Shas Movement v. Minister of the Interior [1989] IsrSC 43(2)
723, abridged in 11 JEWISH LAW ASSOCIATION STUDIES 134 (2000).
108.
See infra notes 111-16 and accompanying text.
109.
Id.

110.

See Pinhas Shifman, Civil Marriage in Israel - The Case for Reform, 13

JEWISH L. ASS'N STUD. 9 (2002).
111.
HCJ 143/62 Funk Shlezinger v. Minister of the Interior [1963] IsrSC 17
255. For a discussion of the judgment, see Maoz, supra note 14, at 105-10.
112.
Shlezinger, IsrSC 17 at 241.
113.
Id. at 241.
114.
Id. at 242.
115.
Id. at 258.
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Justice Suzzman analyzed the provisions of the Inhabitants
Registry Ordinance, 5709-1949, which preceded the Registry Law.
He held that "[t]he function of the registration clerk, under the said
Ordinance, is only to gather statistical information for the purpose of
managing the Inhabitants Registry; he has not been granted any
judicial powers. 11 6 Regarding the status of the Registry as set forth
in the Registry Ordinance, Justice Suzzman wrote, "[T]he Ordinance
did not grant the Registry the force of evidence or proof of anything.
The purpose of the Ordinance was to collect statistical information,
1' 1 7
which could either be true or false. No one guaranteed its truth.
Justice Suzzman further wrote that:
[i]n entering the personal status of the resident, it is not the function of
the registration clerk to give his opinion about the validity of the
marriage. It must be presumed that the legislature did not impose a
duty upon a public authority that it cannot fulfill. It is sufficient if the
registration clerk, in fulfilling his function and entering the personal
status, has been given evidence that the resident performed a wedding
ceremony. The question of the effect which must be given to the
ceremony occasionally involves different aspects, and examining their
118
validity exceeds the scope of the Inhabitants Registry.

A close examination of Justice Suzzman's argument indicates
that he actually relied on two arguments: first, that the registration
relating to the marriage did not constitute prima facie evidence of the
truth of the particulars included therein; and second, that the clerk
was not granted any authority to rule on the matter. The two
arguments complement one another. If the matter was one with
significant practical ramifications, it would not have been possible to
"dispose" of the problem with such ease by claiming that the clerk has
no authority to decide. If the clerk is not authorized to decide, then
the court should have decided the matter by way of statutory
interpretation. The court could only avoid deciding the case by
describing the issue as a marginal one.
In both Shalit and Na'amat, the majority justices used exactly
the same reasoning, i.e., the attempt to downplay the importance of
the Population Registry, this time relating to the rubric of ethnic
affiliation. Their assumption was that the ethnic affiliation rubric
was of no importance, as far as its contents did not even constitute a
prima facie proof of their truth. The upshot of this assumption is that
a decision in the petitioner's favor as to the status of the Registry can
therefore not be regarded as a principled decision on the question of
who is a Jew, and accordingly, it does not exceed the parameters of
neutrality. These justices contended that both their motivation and

116.
117.
118.

Id. at 244 (translated by author).
Id..at 249 (translated by author)
Id. at 252 (translated by author).
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the result they reached satisfied the requirements of neutrality. 119 On
the other hand, the claim to neutrality is incongruous, both in terms
of the result and the motivation. The following analysis begins with
the question of the result and concludes with the question of
motivation.
iii.

The Failure of the Result Test

As stated, the pretension of neutrality of the majority justices in
Shalit is based on their attempt to diminish the importance of the
Inhabitants Registry. However, this attempt to bisect the Registry
laws and the substantive law by presenting the Registry as
inconsequential, is defective on a number of fundamental grounds,
two of which are:
1.
2.

a.

The Inhabitants Registry is a state symbol, and hence the
very act of entry therein is an act of significance.
Even if the Registry itself is not important, the definition
adopted by the Court is liable to "filter" into additional
definitions, with substantive ramifications.

The Registry as a Symbol

The majority justices in Shalit, Pessaro, and Na'amat asserted
that the Registry itself is of no importance. 120 Nonetheless, already in
Shalit the minority justices rejected this assertion. 121 Hence for
example, Justice Landau wrote that "if all this is of so little
importance, why is the petitioner so determined in insisting on his
petition, and why does this petition arouse such general interest
122
among the public in all its various circles" and in Jewry abroad.
President Agranat expressed himself in a similar vein, stating that:
such registration, if pronounced valid, will not only be of technical value
but will possess importance also from the political-social point of view,
as is witnessed by the lengthy debate of members of the Knesset... as

119.

HCJ 58/68 Shalit v. Minister of the Interior [19701 IsrSC 23(2) 477,

translated in

SELECTED JUDGMENTS

OF THE SUPREME COURT OF ISRAEL, SPECIAL

VOLUME 35 (Asher Felix Landau ed., 1971); HCJ 5070/95 Na'amat v. Minister of the
Interior [2002] IsrSC 56(2) 721, abridged in 31 JUSTICE 37-42 (Mar. 2002).
120.
HCJ 58/68 Shalit v. Minister of the Interior [1970] IsrSC 23(2) 477,
translated in SELECTED JUDGMENTS, supra note 17, at 44-45; HCJ 1031/93 Alian
Pessaro v. Minister of the Interior [1995] IsrSC 49(4) 49, 675, abridged in 15 JUSTICE
43-48 (Dec. 1997); HCJ 5070/95 Na'amat v. Minister of the Interior [20021 IsrSC 56(2)
721, 735, 745, abridged in 31 JUSTICE 37-42 (Mar. 2002).
121.
SELECTED JUDGMENTS, supra note 17, at 88-89, 178-79.
122.
Id. at 89.
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well as the great interest which the present case has evoked in the
public at large. 123

Thirty years later, in Na'amat, Justice Englard echoed the
queries of Justices Landau and Agranat. Justice Englard wrote:
The majority in... Shalit... did not tire of stressing that the registration
in the Population Registry was nothing more than a statistical matter,
lacking in substantial importance, and that the decision concerning it
was not a substantive decision on the ideological question of who is a
Jew. However, not only did some of the justices on the panel refuse to
accept this conception; the public at large too rejected it. In the wake of
the Shalit decision a political storm erupted, precipitating a swift
amendment of the law and the repeal of the rule that had just been
adopted by a narrow majority ....
[Iun fact, if the issue was merely one
of inconsequential statistics, why then has there been an ongoing battle
regarding registration? Why have there been so many judgments,
spanning hundreds of pages, comprising the conflicting opinions of the
justices. The truth is, naturally, that the symbol is the substance and
that in the absence of a particular world-view there would be no
decision on the registration question, and no statistics. 124

The Author agrees with the minority view of Justices Landau,
Agranat, and Englard that the registration question is not a marginal
one due to overarching symbolic significance attributed to it, both by
12 5
the petitioners and the respondents.
b.

The Manipulative Nature of the Distinction Between the
Registry Law and the Substantive Law

As explained above, during the first period, which terminated in
1970, the Law of Return and the Registry Law lacked a definition of
the term "Jew," thereby leaving room for a broad range of
possibilities for interpretation. 12 6 In the absence of a definition, in
principle, the term could be interpreted differently in each of the

123.
Id. at 178.
124.
Na'amat, IsrSC 56(2) 721, at 756, abridged in 31 JUSTICE 37-42 (Mar.
2002) (translated by author).
125.
On the symbolic role of legal norms, see Joseph R. Gusfield, Moral Passage:
The Symbolic Process in Public Designations of Deviance, 15 Soc. PROB. 175, 176-78
(1967) ("The fact of affirmation through acts of law and government expresses the
public worth of one set of norms, of one sub-culture vis-&-vis those of others. It
demonstrates which cultures have legitimacy and public domination, and which do
not."). It bears that in Shalit, minority Justice Landau argued that the importance of
the Registry does not consist only in its symbolic meaning. Id. In his opinion, Justice
Landau was not impressed by the technical claim that the Registry Law itself states
that the registration of national affiliation does not even constitute prima facie
evidence of the truth of its contents. Id.; see also SELECTED JUDGMENTS, supra note 17,
at 89 ("The entries in the register, including those of religion and national affiliation,
are in the nature of 'public documents' within the meaning of the Evidence Ordinance,
and it seems to me that although they may not be prima facie evidence, they are still
some sort of evidence.").
126.
Law of Return, 5710-1950, 4 LSI 11 (1949-50) (Isr.).
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laws. In 1970, the Law of Return and the Registry Law were
amended. 127 In the framework of the amendment, a definition of the
term "Jew" was added to the Law of Return, with the Registry Law
referring to the provisions of the Law of Return. 128 As such, from
1970 onwards the term had the same meaning in both laws. If the
court orders the registration as Jewish of a convert under a
Conservative or Reform conversion, then prima facie, this dictates an
identical conclusion with respect to the convert's request to receive
the status of oleh under the Law of Return. As mentioned above, the
endorsers of the neutral position argue-and the Author disputesthat the registration per se does not have any substantive meaning.
However, all are agreed that entitlement to return has substantive
ramifications, for the person meriting it is granted automatic
citizenship of the state of Israel. It could therefore have been
presumed that following the amendment of the Law of Return and
the Registry Law, the neutral approach would no longer be relied
upon as a justification for accepting a petition regarding the Registry,
This however, was not the case, and in Na'amat the court again
reverted to the very same rationale.
As mentioned above, a number of files confronted the panel that
decided Na'amat, some of which raised questions regarding both the
Law of Return and the Registry Law. 129 The court decided to split its
adjudication of the two questions, and accordingly it postponed its
decision on the "double" files, which also included the subject of
return. 13° It was this artificial split that enabled the court to persist
in its adherence to the neutralist claim, according to which the
dispute over the Registry question did not necessarily raise the
substantive question of who is a Jew. In the words of President
Barak, "Registration under the Registry Law is one thing, and status
31
under the Law of Return is another."i
In the Author's view, the court's position is far from convincing.
The assumptions are that (a) the rights and obligations conferred by
the Law of Return are substantial; (b) these rights and obligations
stem from the fact that a person is defined as being Jewish; and (c)
the definition serving the clerk in assessing the applicant requesting
to be registered as a Jew in the Population Register is precisely the
same definition that should serve the clerk in assessing the applicant
requesting a teudat oleh (an immigration certificate granted under
the Law of Return). In view of all of the above, none of which are
disputed, it is unclear how the clerk is permitted (and in view of the

127.
128.
129.
130.
131.

Id.
Id.
See supra Part I.D.
Id.
HCJ 5070/95 Na'amat v. Minister of the Interior [2002] IsrSC 56(2) 721,
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Court's decision, obligated) to register a person as Jewish in total
disregard of the fact that the definition in both laws is identical,
taking a casual attitude to the registration. On the face of it, from the
moment the legislature linked the two statutes for the purposes of
the definition of "Jew," the question became a substantive one in
both of the statutes, and it can no longer be argued that the definition
for the purposes of the Registry is inconsequential. Furthermore,
neither the assertion nor the tactic that it justifies are clear in terms
of their purpose. Ultimately, the court will be forced to rule on the
question of who is a Jew for purposes of the Law of Return, and its
decision will be immediately applicable to the question of who is a
convert for the purposes of the Registry Law. If a Conservative
conversion is valid for purposes of the Law of Return, then it is
equally valid for purposes of the Registry Law. Conversely, if it is not
valid for purposes of the Law of Return, then the registration clerk
will be unable to register the Conservative convert as a Jew (unless
the court formulates a method for persisting in its differentiation
between the two statutes, despite the fact the legislature expressly
linked them-a method of which the Author has no knowledge.)
What then was the purpose of the court's perfunctory deferral of the
decision?
Possibly, the answer to this question lies in President Agranat's
opinion in Shalit. In that case, President Agranat challenged the
assertion that the decision on the question of Registry was devoid of
substantive significance. 132 His claim was that validating the registry
in defiance of the halakhic position was an act of social and political
importance. 133 Agranat observed:
there is room for thinking that [the validation of such a registration]
may in the course of time be interpreted as a crucial turning point
having repercussions on the content of the term "Jew" in other spheres
of life, so that the hala[k]hic rule . will gradually be pushed into a
134
corner.

In other words, according to President Agranat, an act that is
currently presented as an ostensibly trivial issue of registration,
lacking any evidentiary force, may in the course of time become a
catalyst for the endorsement of the petitioner's worldview in matters
of substance. Having become embedded in conventional modes of
thought and opinion, it may ultimately attain the status of an
unassailable social convention. Was this the court's intention in
Na'amat when it drove a wedge between the connected statutes,
giving a provisional ruling in the petitioners' favor, and confining it

132.
133.

HCJ 58/68 Shalit v. Minister of the Interior [1970] IsrSC 23(2) 477,
JUDGMENTS, supra note 17, at 35.
Id.

134.

SELECTED JUDGMENTS, supra note 17, at 178-79.

translated in SELECTED

1266

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VOL. 39.1233

to the question of the Registry? If so, it belies the court's pretension
to neutrality, not only in terms of the result, but also in terms of the
motivation. This point will be further developed in the following Part.
iv.

The Failure of the Motivation Test

a.

Introduction

Until now, this Article has clarified why the pretension of
neutrality espoused by the majority justices in Shalit fails the test of
the result. It raised the suspicion that this defect had been
anticipated, and perhaps even planned from the outset-that is to
say, it was not motivated by neutrality. This Part will attempt to
adduce additional evidence, more overt, to substantiate the claim
that the seeds of this failure were already sewn in the motivation
stage. Exposing the inner secrets of the heart is a formidable task,
but the explicit statements of the justices themselves and some of
their comments evince (almost without the need for interpretation) a
clear identification with the non-Orthodox position.
Justice Witkon's position in Shalit serves as an example. Justice
Witkon prefaced his opinion by concurring with the approach adopted
by his colleague, Justice Suzzman, according to whom "the question,
who is a Jew does not require decision"'1 5 because this kind of
ideological question "has no room in the context of this technical
Law," 136 the entire object of which is "registration and statistical
requirements.' 13 7 Nonetheless, further on in the judgment, Justice
Witkon bore his claws. First, he made it clear that neutrality
regarding an ideological question entails granting equal status to the
religious position, which "supports the objective test," and the secular
position, which "supports the subjective test.113 8 In his view, "if we
wish to act with neutrality between the religious and the freethinking camps, we must not raise any presumption in favor of the
former and place the burden of proof upon the latter. Neutrality
1 39
demands of us to give equal status to both competing approaches.'
Yet, at this point, Justice Witkon summarily abandoned the neutral
approach and proceeded to describe what he perceives to be the
fundamental dispute. In his view, "the real conflict that may lead to
a split" and that is manifested in this dispute, is not between the
religious and the secularists, but between "those who seek to impose
their views on others and those (including religious and liberal people
alike) who put at the freedom of the individual and oppose any

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.

Id. at 96.
Id. at 98.
Id.
Id. at 101.
Id.
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tendency to conformism.' 140 In this regard, Justice Witkon made it
clear that he has 14
no intention of remaining neutral and that his lot is
"with the latter," 1 a position that aligns, so says Justice Witkon, to
the supreme court's regular and consistent position in favor of this
camp-the liberal stream. The result is that what Justice Witkon
initially described as a neutral decision, free of ideological
considerations, is in fact based on the unequivocal preference for a
particular ideology-the liberal ideology.
At this point, Justice Witkon and his faction could make the
following claim of defense: even if one concedes that their decision on
the question of who is Jew, endorsing the subjective test, was indeed
a substantive decision, based on a liberal worldview, 142 it can
nonetheless be described as neutral because the essence of neutrality
entails the preference of individual freedom over society's conception
of the good. In other words, the claim is that adoption of the liberal
stance does not constitute a deviation from neutrality because
liberalism itself is neutral by definition. What follows is a description
of the salient features of this position and a repudiation of it. The
Article will then explain why the reliance on the liberal mode of
thought constitutes a value-based decision that cannot be regarded as
neutral.
b.

Is "Liberalism" a Neutral Ideology?

A significant portion of the liberal writing since the beginning of
the 1970s has been devoted to the rejection of the perfectionist
approach. According to the perfectionist approach: (1) certain
lifestyles are superior to others, and (2) in its formulation of the law
and of the governmental-political system, the legislature is
permitted, and even duty bound to base its decisions on its
conceptions regarding the characteristics of the "good" lifestyle. 143 A
major trend in liberal philosophy, known as "political liberalism"
challenges (at least) the second of the perfectionist claims. For
example, John Rawls, a proponent of the anti-perfectionist
conception, claims that his theory does not purport "to evaluate the
relative merits of the different conceptions of the good," and that in a
state premised on the foundations of justice "everyone is assured an

140.
141.

Id. at 101-02.
Id. at 102.

142. In another context, the Author attempted to prove that the liberal position
does not entail the endorsement of the subjective position on the question of who is a
Jew. See Shachar Lifshits & Gidon Sapir, Who Shall Decide Who is a Jew? On the
Proper Role of the Judiciary in a Democratic State, Bar-Ilan Law Studies (forthcoming
Fall 2006) (Isr.). For purposes of the discussion here it is sufficient to note that the
liberal position is not a neutral one.
143.
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 190-95 (1993) [hereinafter RAWLS,
POLITICAL LIBERALISM].
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equal liberty to pursue whatever plan of life he pleases as long as it
does not violate what justice demands."'144 Hence, over the last few
decades, "neutrality" has become one of the catch phrases of liberal
philosophy.
In time, however, the weaknesses of the idea of neutrality began
to surface. One of the central criticisms against the idea is that it
lacks coherency. The argument is that any political system must of
necessity base itself upon a disputed system of values. 145 Another
powerful claim that was raised against political liberalism is that the
liberal state is by no means neutral. Supporters of this view argue
that liberalism failed in its attempt to rise above the sectarian
disputes and that in effect, it espoused a viewpoint that actively
competes with other viewpoints in respect of which it claims to be
neutral. 146 These two counter-arguments do not focus on neutrality's
essential justification.
They are prepared to accept the basic
assumptions that guided political liberalism in its attempt to
crystallize a political system founded upon the neutral value of
justice, but they challenge the possibility of its implementation (the
first counterclaim), or at the very least, the degree of success in its
implementation on the part of political liberalism (the second
counterclaim). A third counterclaim refutes the justifications given
by political liberals for the need to establish neutral principles of
justice. 147 The upshot of the critique in both of its dimensions
(practical and conceptual) is that for the most part, the neutrality
idea has been abandoned in recent years, and only a scant few persist
in the attempt to justify it. In an article published a few years ago,
Thomas Hurka wrote that "it is hard not to believe that the period of
148
neutralist liberalism is now over."

144.
JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 94 (1971); RAWLS, POLITICAL
LIBERALISM, supra note 143, at 190-95. For a similar opinion, see also, CHARLES E.
LARMORE, PATTERNS OF MORAL COMPLEXITY 43 (1987) (The ideal of neutrality can

best be understood as a response to the variety of conceptions of the good life."); BRUCE
ACKERMAN, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LIBERAL STATE 11(1980). Rawls and other thinkers

sharing his views made it clear that their emphasis on neutrality on the question of the
good life was in fact a generalization on the idea that underlies freedom of religion. See
BRUCE ACKERMAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 99 (1984); CHARLES E. LARMORE,
THE MORALS OF MODERNITY 144 (1996); JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 206
(1993).
145.
See, e.g., WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES: GOODS, VIRTUES, AND
DIVERSITY IN THE LIBERAL STATE 92-94 (1991).

146.
See Larry Alexander, Liberalism, Religion, and the Unity of Epistemology,
30 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 763, 764 (1993) ("[L]iberalism ... is itself just a sectarian view
on the same level as . . . other views that it purports to be neutral about and to
tolerate.").
147.
See Thomas Hurka, George Sher's Beyond Neutrality: Perfectionism and
politics, 109 ETHICS 187 (1998) (book review).
148.

Id. at 190.
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Against the background of the powerful critique of political
liberalism, there is evidence of the contemporary revival of a
'149
competing liberal conception, known as "perfectionist liberalism.
This conception concedes part of the argument raised by the second
group of critics mentioned above-that liberalism is indeed based on
a specific conception of the good. In fact, it willingly expounds the
basic premises of this conception of the good. According to
perfectionist liberals, the principle of free choice has always been the
chief priority of liberalism. 150 Nonetheless, despite having conceded
this much, the perfectionist liberals refuse to accept, in its entirety,
the sweeping contention that liberalism is not neutral. 151 Their
argument is that the liberal position with regard to the value of
autonomy is a second-order claim which enables, and even compels,
neutrality with respect to disputes over first-order conceptions of
good. 15 2 It enables neutrality because from a liberal perspective, no
fault can attach to a person's choice of a lifestyle premised on
obedience to authority, if he voluntarily chose that lifestyle. Hence,
all that is "required" or preached under the autonomy assumption is
that a person autonomously choose the lifestyle that he deems to be
of value. It even compels first-order neutrality because a deviation
from the principle of neutrality induces a person to choose one path
over another, thereby violating the value of autonomy.
At first glance, it would seem that perfectionist liberalism
successfully overcomes the obstacle to the squaring of perfectionism
and neutrality, but upon further examination new anomalies arise.
The alignment of the two values is based on a differentiation between
two levels of treatment of the first- and second-order. Nevertheless,
this differentiation is somewhat artificial. As stated, liberal
perfectionism argues that positing freedom as the highest value is
only a second-order proposition in the sense that it is indifferent to
the first-order disputes over the question of the good. The only
condition it posits is that the state refrain from preferring any option,
thereby ensuring the autonomous nature of the choice. 15 3 But this

149.
The writers belonging to this stream include inter alia William Galston and
Joseph Raz. See Galston, supra note 145; JOSEPH RAz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM
(1986).
150.
151.
152.

RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM, supra note 143, at 190-95.
Id.
Id.

153.

See, e.g., Stephen A. Gardbaum, Liberalism,Autonomy, and Moral Conflict,

48 STAN. L. REV. 385, 395 (1996).

So long as there is meaningful exercise of choice, liberalism based on secondorder autonomy is essentially indifferent to what one chooses (i.e., the object of
choice): whether to enter politics, a monastery, or a commune. Thus, this
account of liberalism is not at all hostile to traditional, customary, or
authorized ways of life; it is hostile only to such ways of life (or any others)
being adopted on the basis of tradition, custom, or authority rather than choice.
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presentation of matters is somewhat contrived. The elevation of the
value of freedom per se is in itself a clear and definitive statement,
directly affecting the value ascribed by its proponents to the
particular choices people make. He who ascribes supreme importance
to autonomous choices (as a second-order claim) will always ascribe
greater value to a choice (as a first-order claim) of a nonauthoritarian lifestyle over a choice (first-order) of an authoritarian
lifestyle, even if the authoritarian lifestyle was chosen and not forced
(for example, the decision to live in accordance with the precepts of a
religion bearing paternalistic, authoritative characteristics).
Perfectionist Liberalism's assertion that perfectionism is a
second-order claim is incoherent. At the very moment that a state
decides to premise its policy of neutrality on the value of freedom, it
deviates from the neutralist position because its very decision
indicates that some first-order options are of greater value than
others. The result is that not just neutralist liberalism, but also
perfectionist liberalism, make a false pretension to neutrality, while
in effect they promote a message and value that are just one of the
many contenders in the marketplace of ideas and lifestyles. Justice
Witkon based himself on the liberal viewpoint, but this endeavor fails
to square his operative position with his pretension to neutrality and
ameliorate the tension between them.
v.

Conclusion

The claim in this Part was that the "neutral" stand adopted by
the majority justices in the matter of who is a Jew did not produce a
neutral result. Symbols have their own intrinsic value, and any
decision in a dispute involving them necessarily involves a deviation
from neutrality. Furthermore, in addition to their independent value,
symbols also play a guiding role in the molding of views that
ultimately influence the crystallization of numerous substantive
arrangements. The Author expressed the suspicion that even the
justices who endorse the neutral position do not genuinely believe in
its neutrality and that its utilization is therefore tendentious, the aim
being to realize the patently non-neutral goal of recognition of Reform
and Conservative conversions for purposes of the Law of Return.
Finally, this Part pointed out that the claim regarding the absence of
neutrality with regard to motivation and result is substantiated by
the fact that justices professing neutrality rely on a liberal
worldview, and the liberal worldview-in both of its competing
versions, political and perfectionist-has failed in its neutralist
pretension.
The second decision-making method is therefore defective on the
same grounds as the first, for in both cases the judge decides in
accordance with a certain substantive worldview, be it Justice
Silberg's Orthodox view, or Justices Witkon and Suzzman's liberal
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view. In a certain sense, the second method is even worse than the
first. In the first decision-making method, where the court openly
and unabashedly decides a value-laden dispute that has yet to be
decided by the public, it exceeds its judicial mandate in a democratic
society. Nonetheless, the actual adoption of a substantive value-based
decision on the part of the court increases the chances that the public
will reopen the subject for discussion and this time reach a
democratic decision. On the other hand, the second mode of decision,
a value-based decision under a pretense of neutrality, may benumb
the democratic decision-making system by rendering the public
unaware of the value-based nature of its decision due to its neutral
presentation, or at least fail to stimulate it to challenge the justices'
value-based decision.
C. JudicialRestraint
The third approach, advocating what some refer to as "judicial
restraint" is represented in Shalit by President Agranat and Justice
Landau. Justice Landau, who also later served as the President of
the Israeli Supreme Court, is known for his judicial and academic
adherence to judicial restraint. For example, when still on the bench,
Justice Landau opposed the broadening of the courts' intervention in
quasi-judicial decisions of the Knesset. 154 Similarly, he directed
scathing criticism at the broadening of the ground of unreasonability
as a tool for evaluating acts of the executive.1 55 He also voiced a
decisive position against the adoption of the U.S. constitutional
model, i.e., the entrenchment of human rights in a constitution and
conferring power to the court to invalidate legislation that violates
these rights. 15 6 A central rationale that connects all of these positions
is Justice Landau's perception that in-each of these scenarios, judicial
intervention is necessarily based on the judge's personal worldview. 157 From Justice Landau's perspective, invoking the justice's
own values as a basis for a decision is illegitimate. In a number of

154.
See HCJ 306/81 Platto Sharon v. Knesset Comm. [1981] IsrSC 35(4) 118,
134-40 (Landau, J., minority opinion); Moshe Landau, Trends in the Decisions of the
Supreme Court, 8 TEL Aviv L. REV. 500, 504 (1980-81) (Isr.); see also Interview, "I Do
Not Believe in JudicialActivism": Conversation with Justice Moshe Landau, 16 JUST. 3
(1998).
155.
See HCJ 389/80 Dapei Zahav Ltd. v. Broad. Auth. [1980] IsrSC 35(1) 421,
425-35 (debate between Justice Landau and President Barak on the subject).
156.
See, e.g., Moshe Landau, Constitution as the Supreme Law of the State of
Israel, 27 HAPRAKLIT 30 (1971) (Isr.).
157.
Justice Landau's position on this issue was extremely similar to the
position of Judge Learned Hand. See LEARNED HAND, THE BILL OF RIGHTS (1958).
Like Judge Hand, Justice Landau did not oppose constitutional entrenchment and
judicial review to fortify the principle of separation of powers and the division of powers
among the different branches. Landau, supra note 156, at 30.
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places Justice Landau stressed additional considerations for his
support of judicial minimalism, among them the damage to the court
as a result of its intervention in value-based disputes, the inherent
logic of the practice of restraint, and an attitude of reciprocal
deference and mutual respect between the various branches of
governmental authority, without the court being converted into the
158
dominating, ruling branch.
Justice Landau's approach in Shalit is an authentic expression
of his fundamental approach. First, he summarily rejected the
contention of his colleagues, Justices Suzzman and Witkon, according
to whom the matter of registration was of no importance. "If all this
is of so little importance," Justice Landau asks, "why is the petitioner
so determined in insisting upon his petition and why does this
petition arouse such general interest among the public in all its
various circles both in this country and in Jewry abroad?"1 59 Justice
Landau was unmoved by the technical argument, that the Registry
Law itself provides that the registry of national affiliation does not
constitute prima facie evidence of the truth of its contents. In his
view, "The entries in the register, including those of religion and
national affiliation, are in the nature of 'public documents' within the
meaning of the Evidence Ordinance, and it seems to me that
although they may not be prima facie evidence, they are still some
1 60
sort of evidence."
From there, Justice Landau proceeded, to the contention of his
colleagues, the majority judges, that the implementation of the
halakhic criterion "prejudices the right of every citizen that his and
his children's national affiliation should be registered in accordance
with his subjective outlook." 16 1 The majority justices regarded this
position as being dictated by the adoption of a liberal worldview.
However, Justice Landau disagreed with his colleagues and argued
that liberalism could not provide a basis for the claim. 162 He
explained that the basic position, i.e., "[t]he very point of departure..
that affiliation to the Jewish people is a matter for selfdetermination," was in issue, given that a significant part of the
Jewish public in Israel, both Orthodox and non-observant, adhered to
the halakhic criterion as the exclusive test for determining a person's
Judaism. 163 Under these circumstances, he explained, the point of
departure of his colleagues involved "a circular argument based upon
164
an assumption which is itself far from being generally accepted."'

158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

Id.
SELECTED JUDGMENTS, supranote 17, at 89.
Id.
Id. at 88.
Id. at 91.
Id.
Id.
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According to Justice Landau, it would have been preferable had
the decision of the issue been avoided altogether by deleting the
rubric of national affiliation from the Registry. 165 As mentioned
above, this was also the position of President Agranat, who drafted
the court's appeal to the government at the end of the deliberations,
requesting it to amend the Registry Law accordingly. 166
Nevertheless, in view of the government's refusal to follow the court's
recommendation, both President Agranat and Justice Landau, at the
end of the day, were forced to decide how they would act. They both
chose the path of non-intervention. However, their decisions are
substantially different, and the difference is particularly significant
for the focus of this Article. The following is a description of
President Agranat's argumentation followed by that of Justice
Landau.
Shalit was adjudicated in the framework of the Israeli High
Court of Justice. As explained above, the high court deals primarily
with relations between the individual and government, and the
standard petitions addressed to the high court are filed in the
167
framework of giving instructions to other governmental agencies.
The authority conferred to the court in its capacity as the high court
is broad in scope, but together alongside the power given to the court,
the high court has the option to refrain from its duty to exercise that
power. 168 This was the escape route used by President Agranat in
Shalit.169 President Agranat mentioned:
[T]he premise, based on a line of decisions, that the High Court has a
discretion when application is made to it by the citizen for relief against
the act or decision of a public authority, and the court will not interfere
170
in the matter if justice does not require it.

According to President Agranat, in Shalit:
[J]ustice does not require us to take up any position on the above
ideological problem, since it is clear that no consensus of opinion exists
in respect thereof amongst the enlightened section of the public and

165.
Id. at 81-82.
166.
See supra note 124 and accompanying text (Agranat's statement).
167.
See supra notes 96-97 and accompanying text (explaining Israeli judicial
system).
168.
Id.
169.
It is interesting to note that both President Agranat and Justice Landau
avoided making use of the screening tool referred to above, namely the doctrine of
justiciability. Explaining his avoidance of the justiciability argument, Justice Landau
stated that "the subject of the nature of the Jewish nation is not in itself
injusticiable ....
That abstention from adjudicating which is our duty in this petition
does not stem from the lack of justiciability of the subject, but from our inability to
draw a judicial answer to the problem from any of the legal sources from which we
usually obtain our inspiration." SELECTED JUDGMENTS, supra note 17, at 94.
170.
Id. at 180-81.
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that any position we adopt would rest solely upon our own private
171
views and personal predilections.

President Agranat's approach is not free of difficulties. His
exhortation for judicial restraint in the question of who is a Jew links
up to a comprehensive view that advocates a minimal degree of
judicial intervention in ideological questions that lack a clear legal
answer. The logic of the position is sound, but it is subject to two
fundamental criticisms. The first criticism emphasizes the fact that
even non-intervention on the court's part does not and cannot lead to
a neutral result. The decision not to intervene preserves the status
quo ante, despite it being acceptable to one party only. The other
criticism focuses on the fact that the application of a policy of nonintervention may lead to arbitrary outcomes. The following will
describe the arguments in brief and explain how they affect the case
under discussion.
The first critique of the "non-intervention" approach stems from
the fear that in many cases, what is initially perceived as nonintervention will ultimately produce a result which, far from being
172
neutral, is in fact a decision in favor of one of the disputant parties.
173
This kind of argument is frequently cited in the field of family law.
One of the recognized doctrines in this field is the doctrine of Non
Intervenes in the Family. 174 This doctrine was regnant in the AngloAmerican law of the late nineteenth and the early twentieth
centuries and has roots in modern thought. 175 Under this doctrine,
the state eschews intervention in family life, at least where it
concerns a functional family. 176 This doctrine was a quasi-umbrella
doctrine underpinning a system of special rules that regulated the
interaction between family relations and a number of different
177
torts, 178criminal, 179 civil
branches of the law, such as contracts,

171.
Id. at 181.
172.
This point is emphasized by Ariel Bendor, The Life of Law is Logic, and
Accordingly everything is Justiciable- On legal formalism, 6 MISHPAT UMIMSHAL 591,
602 (2003) (Isr.) (stating that when the court dismisses a petition by reason of
injusticiability, its decision does not create a legal vacuum; rather it creates a judicial
permit for the governmental authority against whom the petition was filed to continue
taking the actions concerned).
173.
The Author learned about the analogy from the area of family law from a
colleague, Shachar Lipshitz.
174.
On the fundamentality of this idea in U.S. thinking and its traditional
connection with the idea of the family as private and autonomous unit, see Ann L.
Estin, Family Governance in the Age of Divorce, 1998 UTAH L. REV. 211, 213-16 (1998).
See also Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and The transformation of American
Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803, 1835-39 (1985); Lee E. Teitelbaum, Family
History and Family Law, 1985 WIS. L. REV. 1135 (1985).
175.
Estin, supra note 174, at 213-16.
176.
Id.
177.
This is the standard interpretation given to the famous English judgment
in the matter of Balfour. In Balfour, the court refused to enforce between spouses a
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procedure, 180 evidence, 181 and parent-child relationships, 182 and it
prevented the operation of the regular legal rules between members
18 3
of a family.

contract under which the husband undertook to allocate to his wife a sum of money in
his absence. Balfour v. Balfour, (1919) 2 Eng. Rep. 570, 571 (K.B.). It justified this
refusal inter alia by the desire to preserve the family domain as one to which the kings'
emissaries have no access. See id.; see also Banks Mcdowell, Contracts in the Family,
45 B.U. L. REV. 43 (1965) (regarding a similar policy adopted in the United States).
178.
The non-intervention policy receives expression in the immunity in torts
claims filed between a husband and his wife. Originally, the immunity rule was
connected to the doctrine of a "merger" between husband and wife as a result of the
marriage. The immunity rule survived in the traditional laws of spousal relations in
the common law countries, even after the repeal of the merger doctrine. See Salvatore
Patti, Intra-Family Torts, in 4 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW:
PERSONS AND FAMILY ch. 9, at 3 (Mary Ann Glendon ed., 1998) (discussing the laws of
torts in the context of family law); see also, id. at 7-11 (discussing the immunity rule in
the Common Law countries). The immunity rule in torts survived in the United States
until the 1970s. See Kristyn J. Krohse, No Longer Following the Rule of Thumb - What
to Do With Domestic Tort and Divorce Claims, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV. 923, 927 (1997);
Jana B. Singer, The Privatizationof Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV 1443, 1463 (1992).
In Israel, the immunity rule was anchored in Section 18 of the Torts Ordinance (New
Version), 5728-1968, 2 LSI NV 5 (1972), until 1969.
179.
Under common law, there is almost absolute immunity from criminal
liability for offences of violence between spouses, including the rape of the woman.
Most of these rules survived the changes made in the nineteenth century, and they
continued to accompany family law in the twentieth century. See Estin, supra note
174, at 214-15; Singer, supra note 178, at 1462-63 (discussing immunity from criminal
liability in the United States). See also Patti, supra note 178, at 9-10 (regarding the
immunity rule from criminal liability in other Western states).
180,
See Note, Litigation Between Husband and Wife, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1650
(1966) (discussing the general aversion in the common law states to the possibility of
intra-spousal litigation).
181.
For example, the prohibition on testimony of spouses against each other is
based on a ruling of the U.S. Supreme Court from the 1950s. See Singer, supra note
178, at 1463. A similar rule exists in Israel due to the influence of English Law. See
Evidence Ordinance (New Version), 5731-1971, 2 LSI NV 198 (1972) §3 (Isr.) ("In a
criminal case a spouse shall not be competent to give evidence against the other spouse
or compellable to give evidence against a person accused jointly with the other spouse
in the same indictment.").
182.
The doctrine of family privacy is connected to the parents' right to raise
their children without any interference. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923);
Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (two famous judgments on the doctrine of
family privacy). See also Bruce C. Hafen, The Family as an Entity, 22 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 865, 874-75 (1989). Furthermore, in certain cases, the doctrine is broadened, and
the Court will also refuse to intervene in disputes between parents in regards to their
children. See, e.g., Kilgrow v. Kilgrow, 107 So. 2d 885 (Ala. 1958); People v. Sisson, 2
N.E.2d 660 (N.Y. 1936).
183.
Ironically, the principle of non-intervention even prevents the enforcement
of obligations deriving from family law. For example, in one of the most significant
cases in this context, the Supreme Court of Nebraska in the United States held that
despite the existence of a fundamental obligation to support the spouse, the court
would not enforce this obligation for as long as the spouses continued to live under the
same roof. See McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953); see also HENDRIK
HARTOG, MAN AND WIFE IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 6-11, 23-29 (Harvard Univ. Books
2000) (discussing the McGuire case).
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At a first glance, one might think this was a neutralist approach
in the sense that it enabled the abstention from external legal
intervention in the relations of family members. However, a deeper
examination indicates that this approach inevitably involves a clear
decision in favor of one of the parties. For example, as far as
allegations of family violence are concerned, adoption of the doctrine
inevitably means the preference of the aggressor over the victim by
granting criminal and civil immunity to the violent party. In the
context of violence, this characterization of the preference is actually
even more pointed. On the face of it, the rule of non-intervention in
intra-family relations operates symmetrically with regard to all
members of the family irrespective of their gender. Even so, in a
reality in which men are generally the aggressive party, it
184
materializes as a doctrine that overtly favors men over women,
enabling them to beat women with impunity in the absence of a legal
response. The claim of covert preference under the guise of neutrality
is not just relevant to the subject of violence; it extends to family
relations in general. A social reality in which men assume the role of
the breadwinner and have access to the family's financial resources is
a reality in which the failure to intervene in family disputes endows
the man with a built-in advantage over the woman. 185
The other category of claims against the policy of nonintervention underscores the arbitrary nature of such a policy. Here,
too, examples from the area of family law are illuminating. In the
famous Nahmani 186 case the Israeli Supreme Court was required to
decide the fate of the fertilized eggs of estranged spouses. 187 The
woman, Ruth, had filed an action requesting permission to make use

184.
See Ruth Gavison, Feminism and the Private/PublicDistinction, 45 STAN.
L. REV. 1 (1992); Frances E. Olsen, The Myth of State Intervention in The Family, 18 U.
MICH. J.L. REFORM 835 (1985).
185.
The critique of the non-intervention doctrine can be presented in two ways.
First, the non-intervention rule has a rationale, but the practical result of nonintervention is harm caused to the weaker parties. Second, in view of the fact that the
law establishes the basic rules that form the foundation of family life, there is no
rationale for the non-intervention doctrine. For example, a rule providing that the
state does not intervene in the economic relations between parties belonging to the
same family assumes that in the absence of family rules, the salary of each spouse
belongs to the spouse who earned it. However, this rule itself is by no means a natural
rule, but rather a legal decision. Had there been another rule, providing that the
property rights in the salary belong to both spouses, it would have obviated the need
for women to apply to court and demand maintenance, and accordingly, they would not
have required the courts' legal intervention. See Olsen, supra note 184.
186.
CA 5587/93 Daniel Nahmani v.Ruth Nahmani [1995] IsrSC 49(1) 485,
translation available at [1995-96] IsrLR 1 and at http://elyon1.court.gov.ileng/verdict/
search-eng/verdict-by_ misc.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2006); CFH 2401/95 Ruth
Nahmani v.Daniel Nahmani [1996] IsrSC 50(1) 661, translation available at [1995-96]
IsrLR 320 and at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/eng/verdict/search-eng/verdict-by-misc.html
(last visited Sept. 18, 2006).
187.
Nahmani, [1995-96] IsrLR at 5.
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of the fertilized eggs.188 In justifying her dismissal of the woman's
action, Justice Strassbourg-Cohen attempted inter alia to rely upon
the doctrine of non-intervention in family matters. 189 Justice
Strassbourg-Cohen argued that recognition of the limitations of the
law in the realm of family relations and in intimate matters of the
type debated in Nahmani necessitated a policy of non-intervention,
which in the case at stake meant the dismissal of Ruth's action. 190
Justice Strassbourg-Cohen's ruling in Nahmani is an admirable
illustration of the dimension of decision that is inherent in the nonintervention approach. In addition, it demonstrates the dimension of
arbitrariness involved in this kind of policy. As aptly stated by
Daphne Barak-Erez:
The claim of judicial neutrality also receives occasional expression in
the principle of allowing the damage to remain wherever it falls. In
other words: Ruth Nahmani necessarily finds herself in an inferior
position, because she was the one who called for external intervention
in the family unit-by her application to the Court in request of a
remedy (to receive possession of the fertilized eggs).
Further
examination of the subject exposes the extent to which the call for
judicial non-intervention is not a solution, but rather an illusory
panacea that solves nothing. For argument's sake, let us assume that
the hospital . . . in possession of the eggs, had assented to Ruth
Nahmani's request to receive the eggs. In that case, it would have been
Danny Nahmani who would have turned to the Court and demanded
the discontinuation of the surrogacy process. Should the final [judicial]
result be the product of the chance unfolding of events in each case, so
that the hospital replaces the Court as the deciding mechanism in cases
of dispute? 191

The fundamental claims against the non-interventionist
approach are also germane to the subject of who is a Jew. First, in
Shalit, the non-intervention method effectively meant deciding in
favor of one of the disputant parties. The description above of the
approach adopted by Justice Witkon and his colleagues in the neutral
camp quoted the claim that "if we wish to act with neutrality between
the religious and freethinking camps, we must not raise any
presumption in favor of the former and place the burden of proof
upon the latter. Neutrality demands of us to give equal status to
both competing approaches.' 192 As demonstrated, and as indicated
by Justices Agranat and Landau, the ruling of Justice Witkon is not
neutral, neither in terms of its result nor, apparently, in terms of its
motivation. Nevertheless, he was correct on one matter. Refusal to
address the petition, in reliance on the discretionary character of the

188.
189.
190.

Id. at 8.
Id. at 14-16.
Id.

191.

Daphna Barak-Erez, Symmetry and Neutrality in the wake of the Nahmani

Case, 20 TEL Aviv U. L. REV. 197, 204-05 (1996) (Isr.).
192.
SELECTED JUDGMENTS, supra note 17, at 101.
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authority granted by law to the Israeli High Court of Justice, does
not and cannot lead to a neutral result. In Shalit, the petitionersthe Shalit family-petitioned the court against an act or the refusal
to act on the part of other sovereign agencies. 193 When the court
refuses to intervene in a matter, it grants the stamp of finality to the
sovereign's decision, without recourse for appeal. In other words,
when the court abstained from intervention, it was tantamount to a
decision against the petitioner and against the fundamental approach
(the subjective approach), which the petitioner proposed. Moreover,
similar to the discussion in the family context, here too the decision is
one that systematically favors the stronger party (the sovereign) over
the weaker party (the citizen). The subject at hand also provides an
instructive example of the second grounds of critique. Daphne BarakErez's admonition regarding the dimension of arbitrariness inherent
in the non-intervention approach is applicable in this context as well,
given that endorsement of the non-intervention approach may
similarly lead to an arbitrary, chance result. The question of the
petitioners' status when requesting to be registered as Jews will be
determined by the personal identity and the political affiliation of the
Minister charged with the implementation of the Law at the time the
194
application was filed.
Thus far, the Author has described two weak points marring the
approach of judicial restraint. A close reading of Justice Landau's
opinion indicates that Justice Landau, contrary to President Agranat,
was cognizant of these weaknesses and even proposed a way of
overcoming them. Justice Landau explained that from the moment
the Knesset rejected the court's proposal to delete the national
affiliation rubric, the die was cast and the question had to be
resolved. 195 However, "the decision must rest with the Knesset which
represents the people and, so long as the Knesset has not decided
otherwise, with the Government which is entrusted with matters of
policy and depends upon the confidence of the Knesset."' 196 The
implication is that according to Justice Landau, as of the date the
ruling was delivered, the Knesset had already ruled on the question,
perhaps not optimally, but a decision nonetheless. An optimal
decision would have been achieved had there been an act of express
legislation, with a precise definition of "Jew" for purposes of the Law.
Nevertheless, even in the absence of a legislative resolution, "the
expression of the will of the majority of the Knesset was clear from

193.
Id. at 35.
194.
In view of the fact that the Israeli Supreme Court sits in panels, its
decisions too may be arbitrary in the sense that they are determined according to the
identity of the justices sitting in the panel that hears the petition. The legislature's
decision is not arbitrary insofar as it reflects the majority position.
195.
See SELECTED JUDGMENTS, supra note 17, at 94.
196.
Id.
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what it did, and refrained from doing, in connection with the
directives given at various times by the Ministry of the Interior
regarding the very problem before us. ' 197 This point is of cardinal
importance in Justice Landau's opinion and is an essential
component in the defense of his position in the confrontation with
Justice Witkon's position. If one assumes the veracity of Justice
Landau's claim-that there has already been a democratic decision
on the question-it controverts Justice Witkon's claim, because in
that case, when the court decided to refrain from interfering with a
government decision, it was not using the tool of abstention as a
means of taking a position in a fundamental issue but was rather
deferring to and respecting a legitimate decision of the legislature,
albeit a decision adopted by way of inaction. 198
So far this Article has described and analyzed three approaches:
the substantive decision approach, per Justice Silberg and his
colleagues; the neutral approach of Justices Suzzman and Witkon
and their faction; and the approach of judicial restraint, as espoused
by President Agranat and Justice Landau. In the Author's view, the
third approach is the most commendable. The first two decide the
dispute, whether overtly (the first approach) or covertly (the second
approach). The third approach on the other hand, per Justice
Landau's interpretation, accepts the legislature's decision by
inaction.
The third approach is the best of the three, but not an ideal one.
It does not represent the ideal decision-making method because
under a proper conception of democracy, substantive, value-laden
issues ought to be submitted for deep and considered deliberation by
the people and their representatives, and the issues should be
decided in a clear and unequivocal manner. According to the third
approach, what the court accepted and deferred to was not that kind
of decision, but rather a decision based on the legislature's inaction.
Had there been a format enabling the court to induce the legislature
to decide by way of commission as opposed to omission, then prima
facie, it should have been utilized. But does such a possibility exist?
Can the court operate as a catalyst for decision-making? In the

197.
Id. at 84.
198.
One could argue that at all events, the third approach is preferable to the
first two for an additional reason. According to the first two methods, it is the court
that makes the decision. According to the third, the decision is made by the executive
branch. It could be argued that from a democratic perspective, the decision of the
executive branch is preferable to the decision of the court. For the court, as opposed to
the executive branch, is not accountable to the public. See Douglas Kmiec, Judicial
Deference to Executive Agencies, 2 ADMIN. L.J. 269, 277-78 (1988). Incidentally, this is
also one of the possible rationales for the U.S. Supreme Court's Chevron decision.
Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984) ("While
agencies are not directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is .... ").
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The next Part is

devoted to a description of this approach.

D. The Court as an Agent for the Principleof a DemocraticDecision
1.

The Right of the Last Word and the Right (and Perhaps
Obligation) of the First Word

In Israeli and foreign academic writing, it is customary to
distinguish and contrast between formal and substantive democracy.
The first is described as a principle for resolving disputes which gives
preference to the majority position; the second is presented as
imposing a limitation on the majoritarian principle by conditioning
its legitimacy upon the degree to which the majority view upholds

(and gives expression to) a whole series of values, chief among them
human rights. 1 99 The proponents of substantive democracy frequently

invoke this definition in the refutation of claims raised against
Israel's transition from the model of a parliamentary democracy, by

which Israel operated until recently, to the model of a constitutional
democracy-a transition which has been promoted by the Israeli

Supreme Court over the last few years. 200 As stated at the beginning
of the Article, one of the fundamental claims (generally referred to as
the counter-majoritarian argument) made in academic writing
against the adoption of constitutional model, both in Israel and
abroad, is that the adoption of this model contravenes the
majoritarian principle. 201 Supporters of the constitutional democracy,

foremost among them the President of the Israeli Supreme Court,
counter this claim by stating that everything depends upon which

definition of democracy is adopted. 20 2 If the full scope of democracy is

199.
For a discussion of possible meanings for this conception, see, for example,
RUTH GAVISON, ISRAEL AS A JEWISH AND DEMOCRATIC STATE: TENSIONS AND PROSPECTS
37-46 (1999) (Isr.); Barak, supra note 53.
200.
See Menachem Hofnung, The Unintended Consequences of Unintended
ConstitutionalReform: Politics in Israel, 44 AM. J. COMP. L. 585 (1996) (describing and
discussing the constitutional changes that have occurred in the state of Israel over the
last few years); see also Baruch Bracha, Constitutional Upgradingof Human Rights in
Israel: The Impact on Administrative Law, 3 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 581 (2001); Aharon
Barak, The Constitionalizationof the IsraeliLegal System as a Result of the Basic Laws
and Its Effect on Proceduraland Substantive Criminal Law, 31 ISR. L. REV. 3 (1997);
Daphna Barak Erez, From Unwritten to a Written Constitution: the Israeli Challenge in
American Perspective, 26 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 309 (1994-95); Ruth Gavison, A
Constitutional Revolution?, in TOWARDS A NEW EUROPEAN IUS COMMUNE 517 (A.
Gambaro & A.M. Rabello eds., 1999); Ran Hirschl, Israel's 'ConstitutionalRevolution:
The Legal Interpretation of Entrenched Civil Liberties in an Emerging Neo-Liberal
Economic Order, 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 427 (1998); Michael Mandel, Democracy and the
New Constitutionalismin Israel, 33 ISR. L. REV. 259 (1999).
201.
GAVISON, supra note 200, at 37-46.
202.
Id.
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confined to the majoritarian principle, then it conflicts with the
constitutional model. If, on the other hand, a condition for the
democratic nature of a regime is its upholding of the human rights of
the minority, even at the price of invalidating certain majority
decisions, then the constitutional model does not conflict with
democracy, but is one of its necessary derivations.
Elsewhere, the Author has attempted to clarify why this
argument is unsuccessful in refuting the criticism of the transition to
constitutionalism. 20 3 The Author argued that the central problem
does not lie in the constitution's limitations on majority decisions, but
rather in granting the court exclusive power to resolve substantive
constitutional disputes for which no answer can be found in the
constitutional text. 20 4 The Author claimed that from a democratic
perspective, the core of the problem lies not in the entrenchment of
certain values but rather in the central position given to the court as
the creator (through interpretation) of norms, and not just as the
protector of existing norms. 20 5 However, for the sake of the current
discussion, the question of the particular rule of power that ought to
control in the resolution of constitutional disputes is immaterial. The
counter-majoritarian concern is preoccupied with the question of who
ought to be given the right of the last word. The essence of the
question raised by cases such as who is a Jew, with respect to the
necessary implications of a democratic conception, is entirely
different. Here, one needs to determine which body ought to have the
right and obligation of the first word. As the Author understand it,
democracy requires first and foremost that significant questions, the
answers to which are disputed, must be seriously deliberated over
and (initially) decided upon in a definitive manner by the people and
its representatives. A democratic conception that cherishes
deliberations by the people and people's resolution of fundamental
issues not only entails the people's entitlement to discuss and decide
these questions, but also imposes, at the very least, a moral
obligation to actually exercise its right. This conception of democracy
is certainly consistent with the republican worldview, which as is
well known, regarded the participation of every individual in the
collective decision-making process as an intrinsic value. 20 6 In the
Author's view, it is also an imperative of the liberal standpoint, which

203.
Gidon Sapir, The Constitutional Judicial Proceeding as a Political
Proceeding, 19 BAR ILAN L. STUD. 461 (2003) (Isr.).
204.
205.

Id.
Id.

206.
See, e.g., MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DISCONTENT: AMERICA IN
SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSOPHY 5-6 (Harvard Univ. Press 1996).
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focuses on the value of autonomy, and thus entails the preference for
2
personal (and collective) decision over the attempt to avoid it. 07
Statements in a similar vein were made by the President of the
Israeli Supreme Court, Aharon Barak, in one of his decisions:
The people's elected representatives must adopt substantive decisions
regarding State policies. This body is elected by the nation to pass its
laws, and therefore enjoys social legitimacy when discharging this
function ....
Hence, one of the tenets of democracy is that decisions
fundamental to citizens' lives must be adopted by the legislative body
208
which the people elected to make these decisions.

2.

How can we influence the legislature to assume responsibility?

One of the fascinating and unfortunate phenomena, already
noted by others, is the attempt made by so many people to free
themselves from that right-the escape from freedom. 209 The
legislature is no exception. The legislature has two methods for
shirking its obligation to decide substantive questions. Occasionally,
it avoids deciding by delegating regulatory power to the executive
branch. 2 10 Alternatively-for example in the case of who is a Jew-it
intentionally adopts an ambiguous arrangement, the clarification of
which will necessitate an additional decision, whether by the
executive branch or by the court. 211
In the Author's view, under

207.
This description of the implications of the value of freedom can be based on
Isaiah Berlin's distinction between positive and negative liberty. The participatory
component is consistent with the idea of positive liberty. See Isaiah Berlin, Two
Concepts of Liberty, in FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 118-72 (1969). For a similar
approach, which places the decision of the people at the center of the democratic idea,
see David Schoenbrod, Delegationand Democracy: A Reply to My Critics,20 CARDOZO L
.REV. 731, 756-57 (1999).
208.
See HCJ 3267/97 Rubinstein v. Minister of Defense [1998] IsrSC 52(5) 481,
translation available at http://elyonl.court.gov.il/eng/verdict/search eng/verdict-by
misc.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2006).
209.
See ERICH FROMM, ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM (1941) (discussing the escape
from freedom in a broad psychological context).
210.
Two professors take a similar approach to the question of entitlement to
return. See RUTH GAVISON & RABBI YAAKOV MEDAN, A PLATFORM TO A NEW SOCIAL
COVENANT BETWEEN RELIGIOUSLY OBSERVANT AND SECULAR JEWS IN ISRAEL 125 (temp.
ed. 2003). According to their proposal, entitlement to return would be determined in a
Basic Law and would include the child of a father or mother who was Jewish under the
Halakhah, or a person who joined the Jewish people and lives a Jewish life or was
persecuted by reason of his being Jewish. Id. The authors leave it for the Minister
charged with implementation to determine the particulars regarding the recognized
paths for joining the Jewish people, by way of secondary legislation. Id. Gavison
explains this distinction, claiming that the procedures for joining should be "detailed,
flexible, and individual, and thus, are not suited for Knesset legislation." Id. at 142. In
our view, the Gavison-Medan proposal is another inappropriate attempt to evade a
decision on a substantive question.
211.
When the legislature delegates power expressly, there can be no question
that its intention is to avoid a decision. When it resorts to ambiguous wording, the
intention is not necessarily to evade the question because occasionally it simply uses
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circumstances in which a political agency attempts to avoid deciding
substantive questions by shifting the responsibility to another
governmental agency, it is incumbent upon the court to do its best to
thwart that intention.
Many democratic systems rely on an
established constitutional principle that prevents the legislature from
evading its duty to decide substantive questions; namely, the
principle that primary arrangements must be decided by the
legislature.
In Israel, the principle is not entrenched in the
constitution, but nonetheless, in a series of decisions the Israeli Court
ruled that it has certain constitutional status, creating an
interpretative presumption under which, all of its laws should be
interpreted in accordance to the court, absent unequivocal evidence of
212
the legislature's intention to act in defiance of that principle.
Recently the Court used this interpretative presumption in the
sensitive issue of the drafting of Yeshiva students.
The law in the state of Israel imposes the duty of army service
upon every Israeli citizen who reaches a certain age. 2 1 3 Nonetheless,
over the years the Minister of Defense made a practice of granting a
blanket exemption to Yeshiva students from the duty of military
service. 214 This exemption arrangement was never anchored in
primary legislation. In the law that established the draft, there was
a section granting discretion to the Minister of Defense to exempt
candidates for enlistment from Israel Defense Forces (I.D.F.) service
for special reasons and "for other reasons. '2 15 The Minister of Defense
argued that the alternative of "other reasons" vested him with
discretion to exempt the Yeshiva students from the duty of military

awkward phrasing or is unaware of the ambiguity. As such, there is need for external
evidence to prove that the ambiguity is intentional. In the matter of who is a Jew, the
issue is incontrovertible, in view of the controversy and the disputant parties' attempts
to propose clear alternative wordings, which would decide the controversy in favor of
either one of the parties.
212.

Dotan, supra note 30, at 449.

213.
Defense Service Law (Consolidated Version), 5746-1986, 40 LSI 112 (198586) (Isr.), § 13.
214.
Rubinstein, IsrSC 52(5) at 491-96; HCJ 910/86 Ressler v. Minister of
Defense

[19881

IsrSC

42(2)

449-51,

translation

available

at

http://elyonl.court.gov.illeng/verdict/search-eng/verdict-by-misc.html (last visited Sept.
18, 2006).
215.
See Defense Service Law (Consolidated Version), 5746-1986, (Isr.)
The Minister of Defense may, by order, if he sees fit to do so for reasons
connected with the size of the regular forces or reserve service forces of the
Israel Defense Forces or for reasons connected with the requirements of
education, security settlement or the national economy or for family or other
reasons (1) exempt a person of military age from the duty of regular service or
reduce the period of his service ....(emphasis added).
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service. 216 In a recently delivered decision, the court rejected the
position taken by the Minister of Defense and ruled that a reading of
the law in light of the interpretive presumption (of nondelegation)
compelled the conclusion that the law empowered the Minister to
grant individual exemptions, but not to make a blanket decision
217
applicable to all Yeshiva students.
As stated, a proper conception of democracy requires that the
people, through their representatives, reach decisions on substantive
matters. A decision to exempt an entire sector from the duty of
military service is unquestionably a substantive matter, but as
stated, the Israeli legislature had never actually decided the matter.
Without going into a detailed history of the enlistment of Yeshiva
students, it suffices to mention that the exemption arrangement
began with an ad hoc decision of Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion,
adopted in the early days of the state, to exempt 400 Yeshiva
students from military service. 218
Beginning as a provisional
arrangement of limited scope and duration, it survived by force of
inertia, without ever having been seriously evaluated on its merits by
the body charged with the adoption of democratic decisions, the
Knesset. 219 The Court's decision to invalidate the policy of the
Minister of Defense on the grounds of his lack of power to establish
such a primary arrangement ensured that the matter would be
returned for the legislature's decision without dictating the precise
decision that the legislature should make.
The first path of abstention, namely the express delegation of
legislative power to the executive branch, can be blocked by the

216.
THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE FOR THE FORMULATION OF AN APPROPRIATE
ARRANGEMENT IN REGARD TO THE ENLISTMENT OF YESHIVA STUDENTS (2000) (Isr.);

Rubinstein, IsrSC 52(5) at 491-96.
217.
It may be argued that the court's application of the interpretative
presumption was not motivated by its fealty to the principle of a democratic decision
but rather by its substantive opposition to the exemption arrangement for Yeshiva
students. This contention finds support in the decision itself, a significant part of which
is devoted to the court's criticism of the arrangement from a substantive-value-based
perspective, even though ultimately, the court invalidated the arrangement due to the
technical defect of the Minister's lack of power. This contention is further strengthened
when considering the nature of the supreme court's activities over the past decades,
characterized by broad judicial involvement in discretionary realms. See Barak, supra
note 53, at 138-48; Dotan, supra note 30; Shamgar, supra note 30. Under this
interpretation of the judgment, the court's decision to premise its annulment of the
arrangement on purely technical grounds was tactically motivated, in other words, by
its desire to avoid a dangerous, head on confrontation with the Ultra-Orthodox Israeli
population, whose relations with the court are already tenuous in the extreme.
218.
HCJ 3267/97 Rubinstein v. Minister of Defense [1998] IsrSC 52(5) 481,
[Please provide specific page.], translation available at http://elyonl.court.gov.iYeng/
verdict/searcheng/verdict-by_misc.html (last visited Sept. 18, 2006).
219.
For the history of the arrangement, see THE REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
FOR THE FORMULATION

OF AN APPROPRIATE

ARRANGEMENT

IN REGARD

TO THE

ENLISTMENT OF YESHIVA STUDENTS (2000) (Isr.); Rubinstein, IsrSC 52(5) at 491-96.
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establishment of a constitutional prohibition on such delegation. The
barring of the second path of abstention, namely hidden delegation,
poses a far more formidable challenge. In this case the prohibition on
the delegation of power cannot be easily enforced because the
legislature did not explicitly delegate the power of decision; all it did
was adopt an ambiguous arrangement, the implementation of which
would necessitate a decision on the part of the executive branch. Yet,
in the Author's view, this path too can and should be blocked.
Indeed, this was the path taken by the Israeli Supreme Court in the
various stages of the legal saga of who is a Jew. As explained above,
in Pessaro the court failed, surprisingly, to go the last mile and
obligate the Ministry of the Interior to register the petitioner as a
Jewess in the Population Registry. 220 It will be recalled that
Pessaro's petition was based on a previous ruling, which the Minister
of the Interior claimed was confined to conversions conducted
abroad. 2 21 Conversions conducted in Israel, on the other hand, were
subject to the provisions of the Religious Community (Conversion)
Ordinance, which required the confirmation of the Chief Rabbi to give
effect to the conversion. 222 The court rejected the claim, explaining
that the Ordinance was exclusively applicable to matters of personal
status. 223 Having so decided, the result ought to have been to grant
the petitioner's request, in other words, ordering her registration as a
Jewess and granting an immigration certificate. The court however
decided otherwise, making it clear that the Knesset should be
allowed to determine the appropriate standard for recognition of
conversions for purposes of the Law of Return. There is certainly
room for conjecture regarding the court's hidden agenda, but
irrespective of its covert, concealed motivations, the express
reasoning furnished by the court for its decision, reflects an
appropriate policy, not only regarding the question of who is a Jew,
but also regarding any controversy concerning a substantive issue. It
is commensurate with the preferred role of the court in situations in
which substantive primary questions are not clearly resolved by the
legislature. In these cases, as stated, it is the court's duty to induce
the legislature to fulfill its role and reach a democratic decision. In
abstaining from decision and explicitly calling upon the legislature to
decide the matter, the court discharged its judicial function in a
commendable manner.
The common element in the two disputes-the enlistment of
Yeshiva students and who is a Jew-is that in neither of them had
there been any clear democratic, substantive decision before the

220.
221.
222.
223.

See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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rulings of the Israeli Supreme Court. This Article adumbrated the
history of Yeshiva student enlistment above, pointing out how the
arrangement survived by force of inertia in the absence of a
democratic decision. The question of who is a Jew suffers from a
similar syndrome. The ambiguity that characterized the question of
who is a Jew for two decades was replaced by the ambiguity over the
question of who is a convert. In both cases, the Knesset abstained
from deciding by transferring the decision on to other branches of
government. In both cases, in the Author's view, the court operated
in a commendable manner, at least at a particular point in time.
Leaving the question of who is a convert pending in the Pessaro was
intended to prod the Knesset into making a democratic decision on
the matter. A similar purpose was served by the court's decision to
invalidate the Defense Minister's policy concerning the draft
exemption of Yeshiva students, without dictating its version of the
appropriate policy from a value-based perspective.
3.

How to Confront a Stubborn Legislature

Here, naturally, a problem arises, for the court can bring the
horse to the water, but it cannot make it drink. If, despite the court's
exhortations to the legislature, the legislature persists in its
avoidance of an unambiguous decision, what avenues are still open to
the court? The court's persuasion tactics were effective in the case of
the Yeshiva students, leading to the enactment of a detailed law on
the matter. 224 In contrast, its attempt to orchestrate a clear
legislative arrangement regarding the question of who is a Jew failed.
Is there any means of compelling a recalcitrant legislature to resolve
an issue if the legislature is determined .not to resolve it? In the
Author's view, it is possible if the court is genuinely committed to the
task.
It will be recalled that the legislature can adopt one of two
tactics when evading a decision by way of transferring it to other
branches of government: express delegation and hidden delegationambiguous legislation that does not decide the issue and necessitates
a decision by way of interpretation. The claim above was that
blocking the first method of abstention is easier than blocking the
second because all that is required to block the former method is the
enactment of a rigid prohibition on delegation and its strict
enforcement by the court. The second evasion tactic poses a more
formidable challenge, given that the delegation is concealed and not

224.

Deferral of Service for Full Time Yeshiva Students Law, 5762-2002. S.H.

521 (Isr.). For survey see Gideon Alon, Tal Law: Deferring Draft for Yeshiva Students
Passes 51-41, HA'ARETZ (English ed.), July 24, 2002; Dan Izenberg, Supreme Court
leaves Haredi conscription up to Knesset, JERUSALEM POST, Feb. 21, 2002, at 4 (Isr.).
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explicit. The role imposed on the executive branch or the court is not
to decide, but rather to interpret decisions adopted by the legislature;
legislative interpretation is a legitimate activity that both these
branches of government are called upon to perform on a regular
basis. This presentation, however, is only superficial. In reality, as
distinct from other cases in which interpretation is required, here the
need for additional interpretation was anticipated and planned by
the legislature, which intentionally avoided making a decision on the
central question. Is there any way of blocking this abstention tactic?
If the relevant legal system includes a prohibition on delegation,
the blocking of hidden delegation is certainly possible. In fact, it does
not differ substantially from the barring of express delegation. The
court is only required to indicate that despite the pretense of a
decision, there is in fact a covert act of delegation, which in essence is
no different than an open act of delegation and is therefore a
A determined court, armed with a
candidate for invalidation.
constitutional prohibition on delegation would thus be capable of
preventing covert delegation as well. The problem arises in systems
like the Israeli one, in which the prohibition on delegation is not rigid
and serves only as an interpretative tool. Paradoxically, however, it
is precisely the express delegation that raises more problems than
those raised by hidden delegation in the form of ambiguous
legislation. Reference to the two Israeli examples-the dispute over
the enlistment of Yeshiva students and the dispute concerning who is
Jew-will help elucidate this point.
It will be recalled that in the enlistment matter, the Israeli
legislature expressly and publicly delegated the power for granting
draft exemptions to the Minister of Defense. 225 The court returned
the matter to the legislature by exercising the interpretative
presumption against the delegation of power to determine primary
arrangements. 226 It gave the Minister's power a narrow construction,
as intended for individual exemptions and not for a fundamental
decision by force of which an entire sector would be exempted from
military service. 227 As explained, this time the legislature took its
cue and decided. However, the legislature also had the option of
amending the law, unequivocally empowering the Minister to adopt
substantive decisions on the question of the exemption. Had it done
so, in the absence of a rigid constitutional prohibition on delegation of
power to regulate primary matters, the court's hands would have
been tied, and it would have been unable to invalidate the delegation.
These remarks however are only relevant with respect to an express
delegation. On the other hand, in covert delegation by way of

225.
226.
227.

HCJ 3267/97 Rubinstein v. Minister of Defense [1998] IsrSC 52(5) 481, 526.
Id. at 529-30.
Id.
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ambiguous legislation, the court can block the legislature's path, even
in the absence of a rigid constitutional prohibition on delegation. All
that is required is for the court to rule that the legislature failed to
decide on a particular matter and that the court cannot do so in its
place.
The majority justices in Pessaro took a different path. Indeed,
the court refused to decide on the substantive issue and appealed to
the legislature, requesting that it decide. 228 However, together with
this request, the court also made it clear that if the legislature
abstaining from a decision on the matter, the court would decide. In
the words of President Barak:
Our decision today is of purely negative nature. We determine what "is
not" (the non-application of the Communities Ordinance (Conversion).
We do not determine what "is" (the precise nature of the conversion
procedure in Israel). As we stated, the "is" may be determined
explicitly and precisely by the [1]egislature. However, as long as the
legislature has not done so, it cannot be said that there is a lacuna. A
solution to the problem of "is" lies in the Law of Return, which defines
who is a Jew. Should the legislature refrain from adding to that
definition there will no escaping a judicial decision based on the
229
existing definition.

As stated, following the judgment a committee was established,
and it formulated a compromise proposal that was almost
accepted. 230 The reason the proposal was ultimately rejected
stemmed, in the Author's view, precisely from the court's refusal to
characterize the question as one that had never been decided and its
contention that even in its current format, the statute contained an
answer to the question. A balance of fear between the parties is a
necessary condition for reaching a compromise, that is, a situation in
which each party has something to lose from a refusal to compromise.
Regarding the question under discussion, this was never the case.
Ever since Shalit, the court's rulings have broadcasted a subtle but
clear message against the Orthodox position. It did this when it
rejected the Orthodox position on the question of registry, while
presenting its own position as neutral, and it did this when it
consistently rejected the legal constructions presented by the
Orthodox stream (by way of the state) in its demand for exclusivity.
Against this background, it was more than reasonable to expect that
at the end of the day the court would also reject the Orthodox
position on the substantive question of who is a Jew for purposes of
the Law of Return. Under these circumstances, it was only logical for
the representatives of the Conservative and Reform streams in the

228.
229.
49, 747-48,
230.

See supra notes 51-55 and accompanying text.
HCJ 1031/93 Alian Pessaro v. Minister of the Interior [19951 IsrSC 49(4)
abridgedin 15 JUSTICE 43-48 (Dec. 1997) (translated by author).
See supra notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
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Neeman Committee to attempt to torpedo a compromise agreement
in the hope that their patience would pay off, and if they persisted in
it for just a bit longer, the Court would ultimately decide in their
favor. The court's ruling in Toshbeim II proved that the gamble paid
off.
At the end of the day, no democratic decision was adopted on the
question of who is a convert for the purposes of the Law of Return.
However, the failure to decide did not stem from the court's lack of
tools to prevent the legislature from avoiding a decision by passing
the buck to the executive and the judicial authorities. Rather, it
resulted from the fact that the court itself lacked a genuine
commitment to the task.
There was however at least one justice on the Supreme Court
who was prepared to "go the whole way" in his commitment to the
principle of a democratic decision: Justice Yaakov Tirkel in his
minority judgment in Na'amat. In his judgment, Justice Tirkel
challenged the position of the majority justices, who adopted the
second of the four methods-the position that a decision favoring the
registration as Jews of converts who had undergone a liberal
conversion is in fact a neutral decision. Simultaneously he also
opposed Justice Englard who adopted the first approach and decided
in favor of the Orthodox position, invoking substantive justifications.
He also refused to take the third approach of deferring to the position
of the executive branch. Instead, Justice Tirkel proposed a new path,
which is consistent with the fourth approach presented above.
Justice Tirkel wrote:
In my opinion, the result of the rejection of the Funk Shlezinger ruling
was the creation of a "legislative vacuum" in the Registry Law, which
the legislature is obligated to fill, either by a new definition of the term
"was converted," or by an explicit directive to the registration clerk.
Absent such legislation, the term "was converted" appearing in section
4B of the Law of Return is devoid of any legal import, as though never
written. By extension, no importance attaches to the notification and
the certificate received by the registration clerk for the purposes of the
initial registration, nor do they have any ramifications for the
to
amend the
registration.
judgment
intended
declaratory
Consequently, after the ruling was rejected, the registration clerk is not
authorized to make any entry in the registration particulars concerning
national affiliation and religion. 231

Putting it quite simply, Justice Tirkel urged his fellow justices to
refrain from any registration of the convert's particulars, regardless
of the nature of the conversion, for as long as the legislature had not
clarified the meaning of an intentionally ambiguous statute.
However, had Justice Tirkel's proposal been accepted, its
ramifications would have been far more radical. The suggestion to

231.
HCJ 5070/95 Na'amat v. Minister of the Interior [2002] IsrSC 56(2) 721,
767-68, abridged in 31 JUSTICE 37-42 (Mar. 2002) (translated by author).
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instruct the registration clerk to refrain from entering any kind of
registration for purposes of the Registry Law for as long as there was
no definition of the nature of the conversion required, would have
entailed the identical result regarding the Law of Return. In other
words, according to Justice Tirkel not only the right to be registered
as Jewish would be denied to a person claiming to be Jewish by force
of conversion; the right of return would also be denied. If no meaning
attaches to the term "was converted" in section 4B of the Law of
Return, then it is impossible to grant the status of oleh (and
automatic citizenship as a result) to any convert, including those who
An instruction to avoid any
underwent Orthodox conversions.
manner of registration in the Population (Inhabitants) Registry is
certainly a matter of consequence, at least for the applicant who
desires a symbolic authorization of his conversion. However, it is
doubtful whether its dimensions could have sufficed to exert the
public pressure necessary to force the legislature to decide on the
matter. Entitlement to return, on the other hand, carries far greater
weight. If Tirkel's view had been accepted and the executive branch
had refrained from granting rights as an oleh and automatic
citizenship to every convert, including those who underwent an
Orthodox conversion, for as long as the legislature had not clarified
who is a convert, would not the decision of the Israeli Supreme Court
have exerted heavy pressure on the Israeli political system to adopt a
clear decision on the question?
4.

Can a judicial decision be viewed as a catalyst for democratic
decision-making?

Detractors of this Article's thesis might argue that it is
fundamentally flawed by claiming that a judicial decision can and
should be viewed, not as a step that enables the legislature to avoid
deciding, but precisely as a catalyst for democratic decision-making.
In accordance with the description above, it was precisely the court's
decision in Shalit, against the government's position, that finally led
to the democratic decision in the Knesset. Indeed, this decision was
insufficient because while solving the problem of who is a Jew, it
created the new problem of who is a convert instead. Nonetheless, in
terms of the democratic process it was great step forward when
contrasted with the situation that preceded its enactment. The
question then is why should the court not be allowed, on a permanent
basis, to decide primary questions left undecided by the political
On the face of it, such decisions would promote the
system.
democratic process: if the legislature's being unsatisfied with the
content of the decision, it always has the option of changing it by way
of legislation. If the legislature's failing to overturn the court's
decision, its silence or inaction would be deemed acknowledgment on
the public's part of the justness of the court's position.
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This claim is defective for a number of reasons. As stated above,
its underlying assumption is that the legislature's failure to respond
to court decisions attests to its acceptance of the substantive position
adopted by the court. Nevertheless, this assumption is unfounded,
for it fails to consider the institutional significance ascribed by the
public to judicial decisions.
This claim should be familiar to
supporters of the liberal conception. Liberal discourse has devoted
extensive attention to the question of the paths of action that should
be avoided by the state. It is axiomatic that there can certainly be no
justification for coercion in its narrow sense. 232 The accepted position
also opposes the creation of either negative or positive incentives for
the adoption of specific alternatives. 233 Many liberal writers even
opposed any state-based expression of a position within the
framework of purely symbolic acts. This stand derives from the
assumption that any state indication that a particular first-order
system of values is of greater merit than competing systems is liable
to persuade individuals to endorse the recommended view, out of
respect for the sovereign authority, and in contravention of the
principle of freedom. A similar, even sharper fear 234 should also arise
with regard to the results of a decision made by the court. There is
room for concern that a substantive decision of the court would stifle
democratic public debate rather than stimulate it. A big portion of
the public regard a decision of the court as "the Word of the Living
God." As a result, the court's decision would oppressively hover over
deliberative fora, preventing the development of a genuinely
democratic dialogue, a dialogue which should be unencumbered by
prior leanings as far as possible. The decision of the Court is thus
liable to operate not as a catalyst, but rather as a factor which delays
235
a decision.
Another reason for not interpreting legislative inaction as
acquiescence to the decision of the executive branch or the court is
based on the nature of the political system. According to the naive
conception of the legislative process, each member of the legislative

232.

See, e.g., Will Kymlicka, Rawls on Theology and Deontology, 17 PHIL. &

PUB. AFF. 173, 186 (1988). But cf. GEORGE SHER, BEYOND NEUTRALITY (1997) (adopting

the liberal stand that recognizes the value of autonomy does not compel the negation of
coercion).
233.
See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Autonomy and Perfectionism in Raz's Morality of
Freedom, 62 S. CAL. L. REV. 1097, 1147 (1989) ("The trouble with a perfectionist tax is
that it provides a reason for refraining from an activity that is not one of what I have
called 'the merits' of the case.").
234.
It is sharper because unlike those holding the reigns of government, the
court's pretension, which also accords with its image in the eyes of large parts of the
public, is that it does not rule because of its own personal proclivities but rather in
accordance with the dictates of the principles of justice. As such, its decision has
greater influence than a government decision.
235.
On the other hand, endorsement of a position by the Court, after the
conduct of a democratic debate, may actually enrich the public dialogue.
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body votes exclusively in accordance with his own genuine
convictions. It would seem, however, that the parliamentary process
is somewhat more complex and quite often involves political deals in
the framework of which Party A agrees to support the position of
Party B on a particular issue, despite the fact that Party B's position
differs from its own position. In return, Party B will support Party
A's position in another issue. These deals are costly, and their
crystallization is a drain on both the budgetary and the time
resources of the legislature. They also necessitate an apparatus for
enforcement because without an enforcement apparatus, Party A will
have no way of relying on Party B to abide by its undertaking, and
enforcement apparatuses too are costly. 23 6 For present purposes, the
legislature's response to the court's decision necessitates a decision,
and this in turn may entail deals, enforcement mechanisms, and the
ensuing costs. The result is that the legislature's failure to respond to
the court's decision does not necessarily attest to its concurrence with
the contents of that decision; it may ensue from the legislature's
unwillingness or inability to bear the transaction costs involved in an
alteration of its current position.
Finally, even if silence is tantamount to admission, this does not
mean that decision by way of inaction or omission possesses the same
standing as a positive decision. Were the two forms of decision
deemed equivalent, judicial intervention would be unnecessary. After
all, the request for the court's intervention in cases of the kind being
discussed stems from the petitioners' dissatisfaction with the path
chosen by the executive branch. If the legislature's silence attests to
its concurrence with the decision of the court, there is no reason for
not placing the same interpretation on its failure to actively oppose
the government's policy. As noted above, this indeed was the
underlying assumption of Justice Landau's opinion in Shalit. Since
the government's decision invariably predates the court's decision, on
the face of it, there is no reason for not being content with the earlier
decision. Furthermore, in view of the two scenarios for decision by
virtue of inaction, failure to respond to a government decision seems
preferable to the failure to respond to the position taken by the court.
This is true not only due to its chronological precedence, but also
from a democratic perspective, because in parliamentary systems (of
the sort Israel maintains), the government, as distinct from the court,
serves by virtue of the confidence of the constituencies (directly, in
presidential systems, or indirectly, in parliamentary systems).
Summing up, under circumstances in which the democratic
network abstains from systematic discussion and decision on a

236.
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central question-by the adoption of an ambiguous decision that
transfers the question to the executive-it is the court's primary, or
at least initial, task to serve as the catalyst for deliberation and
decision-making. The court would fulfill its task by returning the
question to the legislature, making it clear that it is the legislature's
exclusive prerogative and duty to decide (or more precisely to make
the first decision) on the matter.

IV. THE THESIS FROM THE PERSPECTIVE OF U.S. LAW

A. Introduction
The question discussed in this Article is not alien to the U.S.
reader. It is dealt with by U.S. scholars and courts within the
framework of the nondelegation doctrine. This Part will attempt to
explain how the position presented so far fits into the U.S. discourse
in this field. The Part is divided into two subparts. The first will
briefly review the U.S. doctrine, focusing primarily on the famous
Chevron ruling. This subpart will underscore its relevance to the
Israeli dispute in the question of who is a Jew/convert and will
examine which of the four approaches presented above would have
been available to the Israeli Supreme Court had it adopted the
Chevron doctrine. If the Author were from the United States, he
would probably have joined the camp of those supporting the revival
of the doctrine, which was comatose for the last seventy years even
though it was never expressly rejected. The second subpart will
briefly review the arguments offered by opponents of the doctrine's
application and will attempt to present a new, narrower version of
the doctrine which distinguishes between express delegation and
hidden delegation and only enjoins the latter. The Author will argue
that this version of the doctrine can and should be acceptable even to
those who for a variety of reasons are opposed to the doctrine's
application in its fullest sense.
B.

Who is a Jew and the Chevron Doctrine

Article I, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution provides that "all
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of
Representatives." 23 7 The U.S. Supreme Court has understood these
words to limit the extent to which, or the conditions under which,

237.
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Congress may delegate its lawmaking powers to executive or
23 8
administrative officials.
In two cases decided in 1935, the Supreme Court applied the
nondelegation doctrine for the first time to invalidate provisions of a
statute, which impermissibly delegated legislative authority to an
administrative agency. That statute was the National Industrial
Recovery Act (NIRA), which gave the president broad authority to
revitalize the economy in the wake of the Great Depression. 239 In
PanamaRefining Co. v. Ryan, 240 the Court invalidated section 9(c) of
NIRA, which authorized the president to restrict interstate
transportation of oil produced in violation of state law. 241 In A.L.A.
Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,2 42 the Court invalidated
section 3 of NIRA, which authorized the president to approve "codes
of fair competition" proposed by private industry groups.2 4 3 Neither
244
section contained standards to guide the president's discretion.
PanamaRefining and Schechter Poultry have come to represent
the high water mark for the nondelegation doctrine. Although the
Court has not overruled them, it has not since applied them or the
nondelegation doctrine to invalidate a piece of legislation. In each
case, the Court has upheld the delegation, even where it was based
on vague statutory standards. 245 These cases plainly demonstrate the
Court's unwillingness to enforce the nondelegation doctrine.
The Court's readiness to validate the congressional delegation of
legislative authority to the executive branch received additional
support in the famous Chevron case. 246 In that case, the Court
instructed federal courts to defer to reasonable agency

238.
There are those who dispute the Court's interpretation and claim that a
correct reading of the U.S. Constitution should lead to the conclusion that it does not
contain any such doctrine. See Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Interring the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1721, 1723 (2002) ("[Tjhe Constitution just
doesn't contain any nondelegation principle of the sort the standard view supposes.").
239.
National Industrial Recovery Act, 15 U.S.C. § 709(c) (1933).
240.
293 U.S. 388 (1935).
241.
Id. at 405, 433.
242.
295 U.S. 495 (1935).
243.
Id. at 521-23, 551.
244.
See id. at 538-39; Pan.Ref. Co., 293 U.S. at 418, 430.
245.
See, e.g., Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 768-70 (1996) (upholding a
delegation to the president to define the "aggravating factors" that permit imposition of
the death penalty in a court martial); Touby v. United States, 500 U.S. 160, 166-69
(1991) (upholding a delegation to the Attorney General to add certain drugs to those
listed in the statute, the possession or sale of which would constitute a crime, on the
basis of standards that require the Attorney General to consider the levels of use of a
particular drug and its impact on public health); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, 371 (1989) (upholding the delegation of "the power to promulgate sentencing
guidelines for every federal criminal offense to an independent Sentencing
Commission .... ).
246.
Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
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interpretations of ambiguous statutory terms. 247 The Court devised a
24 8
two-step process for determining when deference is appropriate.
The first inquiry (Step I) is whether the statutory provision at issue
is ambiguous-that is, whether Congress has spoken to the precise
issue or has left a gap for the agency to fill. 249 If the meaning of a
statutory command is clear, then that meaning controls. If, however,
the command is ambiguous, the second inquiry (Step II) is whether
the agency's interpretation is permissible or reasonable. 250 Chevron
purports to give agencies great discretion in interpreting ambiguous
25 1
statutory provisions.
This Article distinguishes between two forms of delegation of
power: express delegation and hidden delegation, i.e., the adoption of
a vague decision that does not answer the question at hand, with the
intention, or at least the awareness, that the question will be decided
by other government agencies. Chevron deals with hidden delegation.
The case concerned ambiguous legislation that left broad discretion
for those charged with the implementation of the statute. This Article
presented four methods for the courts to choose from when confronted
with hidden delegation: the substantive decision, the neutral (prima
facie) decision, abstention from intervention in the decision of the
executive branch, or returning the matter to be decided by the
legislature. It would appear that from the four methods presented,
the U.S. Supreme Court in Chevron chose the third, namely, that not
only was the Supreme Court unable to invalidate the delegation to
the executive branch, it was also obligated to avoid any interference
with its decision. The definition of "Jew" in the Law of Return and
the Registry Law, prima facie, is analogous to the circumstances of
Chevron. This was a case of an ambiguous decision, which
intentionally left room for interpretation. Had the Israeli Court
adopted the Chevron doctrine it would have been forced to take the
approach of judicial restraint and defer to the interpretation of the
Minister of the Interior.
The majority justices in the Israeli Supreme Court did not rule
in the spirit of Chevron. They refused to accept the recommendation
of Justices Landau and Agranat and to defer to the decision of the
executive authority. Even so, it could be argued that at least
formally, the Israeli Supreme Court did not deviate from the Chevron
ruling. Chevron established a two-step model; the prohibition of
judicial intervention in the decision of the executive authority is
contingent upon a prior conclusion that the legislature did in fact
delegate legislative power to the executive branch (by its adoption of

247.
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249.
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a vague definition open to a number of interpretations). As mentioned
above, the Israeli Supreme Court emphasized on a number of
occasions that its understanding was that the Law of Return, even in
its current wording, provided a clear answer to the question of who is
a convert. Translating these remarks of the Israeli Supreme Court
into the Chevron terminology means not progressing beyond Step I of
Chevron to Step II, and hence, there is no call for judicial restraint or
deference to the interpretation given by the executive authority if it
conflicting with the statutory meaning.
The tactic employed by the Israeli Court is not foreign to the
U.S. legal system. Like the Israeli Supreme Court on the question of
who is a convert, the U.S. Supreme Court, too, has frequently applied
the two-step test proposed in Chevron as a tool for intervening in the
decisions of the executive branch. In such cases it too ruled, albeit
somewhat artificially, that the statutory language is sufficiently
clear, and there is therefore no grounds for progressing from Step I of
Chevron, to Step 11.252
There are those who say this strategy of the Court revives the
nondelegation doctrine. For example, Lisa Schultz Bressman argues:
The Court's efforts to find clarity where none exists, while perhaps not
faithful applications of Chevron, are nonetheless understandable as a
form of nondelegation review. By denying agencies the discretion to
interpret ambiguous terms as they see fit, the Court effectively may
253
block the delegation of policymaking authority.

This Author's view of the matter is different. The purpose of the
nondelegation doctrine is to ensure that substantive decisions remain
the domain of the legislative branch. Resorting to interpretative
techniques for illumination of statutory language where the
legislature was intentionally vague without rendering a genuine
decision on the substantive question at stake, does not achieve the
goal of returning the matter for a democratic decision by the

252.
An outstanding example of this approach is provided by Justice Scalia, who
has admitted to successfully avoiding Chevron deference in a variety of cases. See, e.g.,
Babbitt v. Sweet Home, 515 U.S. 687, 736 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("There is
neither textual support for, nor even evidence of congressional consideration of, the
radically different disposition contained in the regulation that the Court sustains.");
Maislin Indus., Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497 U.S. 116, 136 (1990) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (refusing to accord deference to the Interstate Commerce Commission's
interpretation of 'reasonable' as used in the Interstate Commerce Act, stating that
"under no sensible construction of that term could it consist of failing to do what the
statute explicitly prohibits doing-viz., charging or receiving a rate different from the
rate specified in a tariff' (citation omitted)); INS v. Cardozo-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 453
(1987) (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Since the Court quite rightly concludes that the INS's
interpretation is clearly inconsistent with the plain meaning of that phrase and the
structure of the Act . . . there is simply no need and thus no justification for a
discussion of whether the interpretation is entitled to deference.").
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legislature. It simply transfers the decision to the court. One could
perhaps understand the court's desire to avoid granting overly broad
discretionary power to the executive branch. The tactics employed
however, produce a result no less grave than the one it attempted to
prevent, because the decision under these circumstances is nothing
more than a judicial decision based on the justices' own personal
values-in other words, one that buttresses the standing of the court
at the expense of the other two branches.
The problematic character of this approach-utilized by the U.S.
Supreme Court in numerous cases and by the Israeli Supreme Court
in the matter of who is a Jew-becomes even clearer when viewed
from the perspective of the aforementioned gradation between the
first and the second approaches. It will be recalled that this Article's
claim is that both of the two approaches should be rejected because
they both entail a substantive judicial decision. Even so, the second
approach, presenting itself as neutral, was the more problematic of
the two because it camouflages the decision in a manner that
prevents, or at least delays, the public criticism of the Court's
position. The attempts made by the Israeli and U.S. Supreme Courts
to find clarity where none exists is highly reminiscent of this second
approach. In this case, while the Court does not claim neutrality in
terms of the result, it does conceal the existence of discretion in the
strong sense in its judgment, and as a result, it delays the public
debate regarding the legitimacy of its decision.
C. Proposalfor an Intermediate Approach to the Question of
Delegation
The U.S. Supreme Court's circumvention of the enforcement of
the nondelegation doctrine triggered conflicting reactions. Numerous
writers criticized the Court's approach, arguing that it contradicted
fundamental democratic principles. 254 Others expressed support for
the Court's policy, arguing that the delegation of legislative power to
the executive branch actually strengthens democracy. 255 However,
the policy of the U.S. Supreme Court does not necessarily express

254.
See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY
JUDICIAL REVIEW 132-34 (1980); THEODORE J. Lowi,
SECOND REPUBLIC OF THE UNITED 124-26 (W. W.
SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: How
THROUGH DELEGATION 10 (1993); see also Marci A.

AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF
THE END OF LIBERALISM: THE
Nortion & Co. 1979); DAVID
CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE
Hamilton, Representation and

Nondelegation: Back to Basics, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 807, 821 (1999) (noting that
delegation to agencies avoids the national scrutiny that Congress receives);
Schoenbrod, supra note 207, at 740.
255.
Dan M. Kahan, Democracy Schmemocracy, 20 CARDOZO L. REV. 795 (1999);
Peter H. Schuck, Delegation and Democracy: Comments on David Schoenbrod, 20
CARDOZO L. REV. 775 (1999); JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE 132-

36 (1997).
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consent to delegation. Some commentators suggest that the Court's
reluctance to use the nondelegation doctrine seems to be rooted, in
part, in the institutional concern that courts would be unable to draw
sensible lines between permitted and prohibited delegations. 256 This
257
interpretation is supported by explicit remarks of Justice Scalia.
Justice Scalia's position is consistent with his general,
minimalist conception of the judicial role in the constitutional
context. However, even if one appreciates Justice Scalia's concern
that exercise of the nondelegation doctrine leaves the Court with
overly powerful discretion due to the ambiguity of the doctrine, this
does not justify a total abandonment of the doctrine and a permit for
unsupervised delegation. The following paragraphs will outline an
additional course of action available to the Court, one that could be
adopted by even a minimalist like Justice Scalia. In the Author's
view, this option should even be acceptable to those who support
delegation in principle.
It will be recalled that the legislature can delegate power in two
ways: express delegation and hidden delegation. This Article clearly
favors those who oppose the delegation of legislative powers, be it
through express or hidden delegation. Even so, one can distinguish
between the two types of delegation in terms of the intensity of their
potential problems. Hidden delegation is more problematic than
express delegation. Where a delegation is express, the identity of the
person making the decision is clear. The executive agency is the one
empowered to decide, and accordingly it will also be publicly
accountable for the decision. Where the delegation is hidden, on the
other hand, it is altogether unclear who exactly made the decision,
and the result is the absence of any person to pay the public price for
a controversial decision. The legislature can cower behind the
ambiguous wording, and the executive branch can claim that it does
not decide, but only interprets the legislature's decision.
On the face of it, the Author's position regarding the problematic
nature of hidden delegation should be concurred with not only by the
opponents of delegation, but also by its supporters in principle. Those
supporting the delegation of legislative power to executive agencies to
decide primary questions do so inter alia, because they think that for

256.
Cass R. Sunstein & Adrian Vermeule, Interpretationand Institutions, 101
MICH.L. REV. 885, 887 (2003).
257.
Justice Scalia says that the Court has recognized that once some delegation
is permitted, "the debate over unconstitutional delegation becomes a debate not over a
point of principle but over a question of degree." Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S.
361, 415 (1989) (Scalia, J., dissenting). Furthermore, "the limits of delegation 'must be
fixed according-to common sense and the inherent necessities of [government]."' Id. at
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various reasons agency decision-making is more responsive to public
interest than is congressional legislation. 258 This contention may be
challenged, but it appears that even its supporters would concede
that its truth is at least partially dependent on public awareness of
the fact that the executive agency is actually making the decision.
If hidden delegation is excessively problematic (even according to
the proponents of delegation in principle), there may be a middle road
between the blanket prohibition of delegation and its unqualified
validation, a possibility of distinguishing between hidden and express
delegation, prohibiting only the former. According to this proposal,
should the legislature wish to delegate power to the executive branch,
it is permitted to do so, provided that it explicitly declares its
intention to delegate legislative power. The use of ambiguous
wording as a delegation tactic would be invalidated by the court, and
the matter would be returned to the legislature's door.
The
legislature would then be required to do one of the following: make its
own decision or expressly delegate its decision-making power to the
executive branch.
This intermediate possibility is consistent with Justice Tirkel's
approach in Na'amat. Justice Tirkel did not contend that the
legislature was not permitted to delegate its power to the executive
branch, nor was he capable of making such an assertion because in
Israel the prohibition on delegation has no express constitutional
anchorage. Nonetheless, he insisted that the issue involved a hidden
delegation and thus refused to concur with the majority justices who
denied the fact of delegation by claiming that even in its current
259
wording, the statute contained a decision on the specific dispute.
This intermediate possibility could also be acceptable to Justice
Scalia. As mentioned, Justice Scalia was wary of adopting an
amorphous constitutional principle that would leave the Court with
overly broad discretion in deciding what was permissible legislative
delegation and what was not. Acceptance of the intermediate
possibility allows an almost complete solution to the problem.
According to the proposal, even if the Court is left with broad
discretion on the question of whether the matters delegated are of a
primary legislative character, the Court is not permitted to invalidate
the delegation of legislative power altogether. It is only permitted to
require that such delegation be explicit.

258.
See Schuck, supra note 255, 782.
259.
HCJ 5070/95 Na'amat v. Minister of the Interior [2002] IsrSC 56(2) 721,
767-68, abridgedin 31 JUSTICE 37-42 (Mar. 2002).

1300

VANDERBIL TJOURNAL OF TRANSNA TIONAL LAW

[VOL. 39.:1233

V. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
1.

2.

3.

4.

5.

It happens quite often that the legislature avoids the
adoption of decisions on substantive questions by
transferring the decision-making task to the executive or
the judiciary. It does this either by way of express or
hidden delegation, i.e., by using ambiguous wording that on
the face of it only requires interpretation but in fact
requires a substantive decision on the matter at stake. The
history of the who is a Jew controversy exemplifies the
second kind of circumvention, namely, the legislature's
intentional choice of ambiguous wording, which concealed
the dispute without deciding it.
While resolving delegated issues, when the judicial branch
is required to address a decision made by the executive
branch, it can choose one of four methods of response. In the
issue of who is a Jew, various justices in the Israeli
Supreme Court represented each of the four methods.
One of the methods of response is to decide the dispute by
resorting to substantive arguments. This method is
problematic from a democratic perspective. The judge's role
is not to create norms based on his own worldview, but
rather to apply existing norms that were democratically
adopted by the sovereign authorities responsible for their
creation. Admittedly, a sharp distinction between the
application of norms and their creation is somewhat
artificial, and clearly a judicial decision cannot be entirely
free of discretion involving a measure of value-based
subjectivity. Nonetheless, a substantive decision in
controversies of the kind at issue, which the legislature
itself has not decided, necessarily entails a pure and
unadulterated act of a value-based judicial decision. Such a
decision on its face exceeds even what is acceptable in the
moderated' characterization of the judicial role.
The premising of the judicial decision on subjective valuebased considerations is particularly severe in cases of the
kind at issue, in which the court is not requested to examine
a value judgment that was democratically adopted but
rather to rule on a question that the democratic system has
yet to decide. The principle requirement of democracy is
that significant questions, the answers to which are
disputed, should be seriously discussed and clearly decided
by the people and their representatives. This is not only the
people's right; it is their duty. When the court rules on
questions that have yet to be decided by the legislature, it is
blatantly and unjustifiably intervening in the democratic
process.
A second method of response is to decide in favor of a
particular approach while presenting the decision as a
neutral decision that does not rule on the substantive
dispute and does not rely on a value-based subjective
position. This method was used by most of the justices who
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6.

7.

8.

9.

10.

11.

12.
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addressed the question of who is a Jew, and it too should be
rejected. Even if the pretense of neutrality is made in good
faith, the technical decision is usually a substantive one as
well, or at least one that in the future may lead to a
substantive decision. Furthermore, in most of the cases the
pretense of neutrality is nothing more than a spurious
fagade, intended to camouflage a clear value-based decision.
Like the previous method, this method of response is
problematic due to the court's arrogation of a role properly
belonging to the legislature. In a certain sense, this second
method is even more problematic than its predecessor
because of its pretension to neutrality, which (on the levels
of result and of motivation) prevents or at least delays the
public criticism of the value-based decision chosen by the
court.
The third method of response is judicial restraint. In the
absence of an express legal source or public consensus
against the decision of the executive authority, the court
will refrain from intervening in its decision.
This form of response exacts a considerable price. First, the
decision not to intervene leaves the status quo ante intact,
despite its being acceptable to only one of the parties. In
other words, it does not and cannot lead to a neutral result.
Secondly, the implementation of the non-intervention policy
is liable to lead to arbitrary results.
Despite the problematic aspect of the third response, it has
an advantage over the two previous ones. As stated, in a
democratic system, the legislative branch should adopt the
decision expressly. However, the legislature can also
express its opinion by avoiding any intervention in the
decision of the executive branch. A decision by way of
avoidance is not an optimal decision, but it is a decision
nonetheless. The approach of judicial restraint can therefore
be characterized as a decision not to intervene in the
decision of the executive, which was ratified by the silent
consent of the legislative branch.
The fourth method of response, which is also the most
correct from a democratic perspective, is the adoption of a
tactic geared to compel the legislature or at least to pressure
it into reaching a democratic decision on the matter at
hand.
This was also the approach taken by the Israeli Supreme
Court for a brief period when it adjudicated the issue of who
is a Jew; however, even during that period of time, it failed
to make optimal use of the approach. Unfortunately, in the
long term the court was unable to resist the temptation and
ultimately its justices chose to consistently use the method
of the neutral presentation, which is the most lamentable of
the four possible methods.
The U.S. doctrine of nondelegation is consistent with the
fourth method of response. However, during the last few
decades the U.S. Supreme Court has refrained from
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invoking it, even though it has never been formally
overruled. One of the methods for circumventing this
doctrine is to deny the existence of the delegation, in
reliance on the double test established in Chevron.
Even if one can understand the concern of the U.S. Supreme
Court regarding the doctrine's effect, it is possible to
consider it in a restricted sense, which would distinguish
between express delegation and hidden delegation, and
would only permit the former. In this way, the identity of
the specific branch that adopts the concrete decision is clear,
and it is accountable to the public for the contents of the
decision.

